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No one knows how the intent standard works in racial discrimination cases, though many have speculated. To test the speculation,
this study examines how the intent standard actually operates. Its
findings cast doubt on whether we really know how any legal standard functions.
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I
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

Since 1976, when the Supreme Court decided Washington v. Davis,' fourteenth amendment equal protection claims have required
proof of intentional discrimination. Such proof establishes a racial
classification and racial classifications receive strict scrutiny by
courts. Because strict scrutiny is fatal in fact, if not in theory, 2 the
intent requirement is the crucial hurdle that victims of discrimination must clear to obtain relief.
The Court in Davis disparaged the importance of demonstrated,
racially disproportionate effects, prompting a flurry of criticism 3 that
continues. This criticism assumes that an intent standard will rarely
be satisfied and that, while it governs, many racial wrongs will remain unproven and therefore unrighted. Except in particular subfields (such as school desegregation 4), subsequent Supreme Court
decisions support this assumption, 5 thereby fueling the anti-intent
fires. To explore the assumption that most plaintiffs would be unable to prove discriminatory intent, this Article examines all the federal district and appellate court opinions published in the twelve
years following Davis.6 The results are divisible into two major areas: (1) the volume and success of intent claims, and (2) the factors
that influence the outcome of intent cases.
With respect to volume and success, our findings suggest that,
despite social scientific evidence of substantial racial discrimination,
victims file surprisingly few intent claims, not more than a few per
federal district per year. The intent cases succeed at trial slightly
less often than non-civil rights cases, but not less often than other
civil rights cases. Intent cases rarely result in damages awards. The
story on appeal is complicated. Very few intent cases succeed on
appeal, fewer than one per circuit per year, but this is attributable to
the small number of cases appealed and not to unusually low success rates. Lower court rulings for both plaintiffs and defendants in
intent cases are more difficult to overturn than are rulings in both
1

426 U.S. 229 (1976).
2 Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of Evolving
Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. REv. 1, 8
(1972).
3 See infra text accompanying notes 64-67.
4 See Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, reh'g denied, 444 U.S. 887
(1979); Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526, reh'g denied, 444 U.S. 887 (1979).
5 See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, reh'g denied, 482 U.S. 920 (1987); City of
Memphis v. Greene, 451 U.S. 100, reh'g denied, 452 U.S. 955 (1981) (thirteenth amendment case); City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980) (fifteenth amendment case);
Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
6 We also studied intent claims in state and district courts. See infra text accompanying notes 99 & 128.
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non-civil rights cases and in other civil rights cases. Despite their
stability, intent cases provoke more dissents and concurrences than
other appellate cases.
The expert judgment that plaintiffs would have a low success
rate in intent cases is not verifiable by observing all published opinions. Intent claimants' success rate is not markedly different from
that of other civil rights claimants. The more striking finding is the
low volume of intent litigation. The Supreme Court's standard
takes its toll not through an unusually high loss rate for those plaintiffs reaching trial or appeal, but by deterring victims from even filing claims.
The second area of inquiry, assessing which factors increase the
likelihood of plaintiff success, yields surprising results with implications that transcend the specific area of intentional race discrimination cases. Several factors by which knowledgeable observers would
expect to explain the pattern of opinion results turn out to be unimportant. Comparing results at the district and appellate court levels
leads to an even more startling result: different factors lead to sustaining intent claims at the two opinion levels. Thus, the student of
district court opinions observes an intent standard that differs in operation from the standard that would be seen by the peruser of appellate court opinions.
The results here suggest the possible benefits of reevaluating,
using statistical techniques, the accepted wisdom about how legal
doctrines function. Our largely untried technique 7 of reading
nearly all of the cases in an area and subjecting them to multivariate
analysis, provides insights and raises issues beyond the grasp of
traditional scholarly legal analysis, which typically relies on small
samples of cases chosen for their pedagogic or other interest. The
law professor or practitioner who reads three or four cases and
identifies the crucial factor or factors in a legal area may be working
from too small a sample; those relying on insights into a "leading"
case may find their conclusions unsupported by the mass of legal
decisions. 8 Even in an area as intensely analyzed as racial discrimi7 Examples of similar approaches are Paul Burstein & Kathleen Monaghan, Equal
Employment Opportunity and the Mobilization of Law, 20 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 355 (1986); Vicki
Schultz, Telling Stories About Women and Work: JudicialInterpretationsof Sex Segregation in the
Workplace in Title VII Cases Raising the Lack of Interest Argument, 103 HAuv. L. REv. 1749

(1990); and Robert B. Thompson, Piercingthe Corporate Veik An Empirical Study, 76 CoRNELL L. REV. 1036 (1991).
8
The findings also add to the growing body of empirical literature focusing on the
selection effect at various stages of the legal system. E.g., Theodore Eisenberg, Testing
the Selection Effect: A New Theoretical Framework with Empirical Tests, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 337
(1990); George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J.
LEGAL STUD. 1 (1984). These studies show that cases litigated to conclusion in district
court are not a random cross-section of filed cases.
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nation, multivariate analysis offers insights into decision patterns
unavailable through traditional legal analytical techniques.
A.

Doctrinal History of the Intent Standard

The fourteenth amendment's history clearly shows that the primary purpose of the equal protection clause was to prohibit at least
some forms of official racial discrimination. 9 How discrimination
should be defined is not so clear. Until relatively recently, neither
the Supreme Court nor its commentators had settled on a single
comprehensive definition.
In Strauder v. West Virginia,'0 decided in 1879, the Supreme
Court invalidated a law that explicitly excluded blacks from juries.
One explanation the Court offered for its holding stressed the need
for impartiality, thus foreshadowing the intent standard: "IT]he law
1
in the States shall be the same for the black as for the white."'
Other language in the opinion, however, sounded impact themes:
The statute was suspect because it was "a stimulant to that race prejudice which is an impediment to ... equal justice"; 12 because it implied "inferiority in civil society";' 3 because it was "practically a
brand upon [blacks]";' 4 and because it was a step "towards reducing
[blacks] to the condition of a subject race." 15
Shortly after Strauder, the Court invalidated a facially neutral ordinance in Yick Wo v. Hopkins. 16 The ordinance, which regulated the
operation of laundries in wooden buildings, had been administered
in a blatantly unequal fashion: permits to operate laundries were
granted to all but one white applicant but to none of the approximately 200 Chinese applicants; moreover, at least 150 Chinese owners, but none of eighty comparable white owners, had been arrested
for not complying with the ordinance.17 Yick Wo established that the
discrimination prohibited by the equal protection clause extended
beyond explicit racial classifications. But because the extreme disparate impact of the ordinance could only have resulted from an
intent to discriminate, Yick Wo did not clarify whether impact or intent was crucial.
9

Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 81 (1873). The scope of the four-

teenth amendment's intended prohibition remains the subject of debate. See William E.
Nelson, FourteenthAmendment, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN CONSTrrurION 757,
760 (Leonard Levy, Kenneth Karst & Dennis Mahoney eds. 1986).
10 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
11 Id at 307.
12 Id. at 308.
13 Id.
14

Id.

15
16
17

Id.

118 U.S. 356 (1886).
Id. at 359.
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Ten years later, in the notorious decision of Plessy v. Ferguson,'8
the Court upheld a system of explicit, state-enforced segregation
and cavalierly dismissed the importance of disparate effects. The
segregation in Plessy was purportedly different from the discrimination in Strauder and Yick Wo, for the Louisiana statute at issue did not
simply deny a benefit to one racial group.' 9 Although the statute
classified persons by race, it could be said to be impartial, treating
both races the same; its mandate of "equal but separate" accommodations for the races on trains reciprocally excluded whites and
blacks from the other race's "equal" privileges. 2 0 To counter such a
construction of equality requires arguments about the psychological
and social effects of segregation. The Court in Plessy rejected such
arguments on the ground that if "the enforced separation of the two
races stamps the colored race with a badge of inferiority... it is not
by reason of anything found in the act, but solely because the

colored race chooses to put that construction upon

it. ' ' 21

The Supreme Court upheld "separate but equal" Jim Crow
laws for nearly sixty years, striking down segregated facilities only
when they were tangibly unequal, for only in cases of tangible inequality was the state deemed accountable for the different effects
segregation had upon whites and blacks. 22 Then in Brown v. Board of
Education2 3 the Court backtracked, holding that the equal protection
clause forbids dejure segregation in the public schools, whether or
not the segregated schools were superficially equal. Despite Brown's
heavy reliance on the special role of education and the destructive
consequences of segregation for black children, the Court quickly
extended Brown to other contexts. 24 At the least, Brown reversed
Plessy, and established that all explicit state-enforced racial classifications are subject to strict scrutiny.
How much further Brown extended the definition of discrimination was unclear for another two decades. The Brown opinion emphasized that racial segregation of black children "generates a
feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that may
affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone." 2 5
Such language suggested that stigmatizing, subordinating elects con18
19

163 U.S. 537 (1896).
Id. at 556-57 (Harlan, J., dissenting).

20
21

Id

Id. at 551.
E.g., Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, reh'g denied, 340 U.S. 846 (1950).
23
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
24 E.g., New Orleans City Park Improvement Ass'n v. Detiege, 358 U.S. 54, rehk'g
denied, 358 U.S. 913 (1958); Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903, rehk denied, 352 U.S. 950
(1956); Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955); Mayor of Baltimore v. Dawson,
350 U.S. 877 (1955).
25 Brown, 347 U.S. at 494.
22
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stitute discrimination, and other post-Brown decisions contained
similar evocations of caste and class effects. 26 Moreover, the Court's
subsequent school desegregation holdings were easily susceptible to
an effects interpretation. Its repeated rulings that school districts
that had been segregated by law did not comply with the fourteenth
amendment merely by enacting race-neutral measures, could be
read to imply that actual integration was constitutionally required.
Justice Powell, in a concurring opinion, even urged that governments had an obligation to provide integrated schools, whether or
27
not de jure segregation had ever existed.
Two 1971 cases seemed to confirm an effects approach to discrimination. In Griggs v. Duke Power Co. ,28 the Court interpreted the
Title VII statutory prohibition against employment discrimination
based upon race to outlaw any hiring practice that disqualified a disproportionate number of blacks, unless that practice was justified by
"business necessity." 2 9 The Griggs rule expressly included facially
neutral practices, and even those adopted with neutral intent. 30 Because nothing in the legislative history or general language of the
statute appeared to distinguish the kind of discrimination covered
by the statute from the kind of discrimination covered by the Constitution, several courts of appeals extended the Griggs approach to
equal protection claims.3 1 Attempting to translate the business necessity rule for public sector use, those courts concluded that the
government could take measures that have harsh impacts on blacks
only when it can provide a strong justification for those measures.
That same year the Court decided Palmer v. Thompson,3 2 which
upheld the municipal decision to close the Jackson, Mississippi
swimming pools rather than desegregate them. The Court reasoned that the record showed "no state action affecting blacks differently from whites" 3 3 and said that racial "motivation" alone does
not render state action suspect.3 4 The Court's explanation of prior
cases that alluded to discriminatory motive was that "the focus...
was on the actual effect of the enactments, not upon the motiv[e]
26 See, e.g., White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973) (invalidating a state's use ofmultimember election districts on the ground that the system operated to exclude minorities
from participation in the political process); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967)
(noting that miscegenation laws were designed to maintain white supremacy).
27 Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1,413 U.S. 189, 224, reh'g denied, 414 U.S. 883 (1973).
28 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
29 Id at 431.
30 Id at 432.
31
See cases cited in Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 244-45 & n.12 (1976).
32
403 U.S. 217 (1971).
33 Id. at 225.
34 Id. at 224.
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which led the [s]tates to behave as they did."'3 5 Effect was at its
zenith.
The zenith was brief. In 1976, the Supreme Court ruled in
Washington v. Davis3 6 that a showing of discriminatory intent was a
prerequisite to finding a violation of the equal protection clause.
The opinion distinguished the statutory and constitutional standards and questioned several appellate court decisions that had extended Griggs to equal protection claims.3 7 It also disavowed any
reading of Palmer that would forbid inquiry into motive, and hinted
that an explanation for the result in Palmer might lie in the fact that
both discriminatory intent and disproportionate impact would have
to be demonstrated to show a violation of the equal protection
clause.3 8
The plaintiffs in Davis had challenged a testing program for the
Washington, D.C. police force on the ground that it failed many
more blacks than whites. Because they had made no allegations except disparate impact, their case was over when the Supreme Court
held that discriminatory intent is necessary for a finding of unconstitutional discrimination.3 9 Questions concerning the application of
the intent requirement could be postponed.
The Court turned to the subjects of proper inquiry in the determination of racially discriminatory intent in Village of Arlington Heights
v. MetropolitanHousing Development Corp.40 "[W]ithout purporting to
be exhaustive," Justice Powell's majority opinion briefly addressed
42
seven factors. 41 The first factor, "an important starting point,"
would often be the action's impact:
Sometimes a clear pattern, unexplainable on grounds other than
race, emerges from the effect of the state action even when the
governing legislation appears neutral on its face. The evidentiary
inquiry is then relatively easy. But such cases are rare. Absent a
pattern as stark as that in Gomillion [where a state used a grotesque, twenty-eight-sided figure to exclude all black citizens from
a city] or Yick Wo, impact alone is43 not determinative, and the
Court must look to other evidence.
A footnote to this passage acknowledged that several jury selection
cases fell into the "clear pattern" category despite the absence of
35
36

Id at 225.
426 U.S. 229 (1976).

37

Id at 244-45 & n.12.

38
39
40
41
42

43

Id. at 243.
Id at 246.

429 U.S. 252 (1977).

Id at 266.
Id.
I (citations omitted).
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extreme statistical patterns, ascribing this exception to "the nature
of the jury selection task." 4 4 After this discussion of "clear pattern"
evidence and lesser showings of disparate impact, the Court listed
as further factors the historical background of the decision, the specific sequence of events leading up to the challenged decision, departures from the normal procedural sequence, substantive
departures, and the legislative or administrative history of the decision.45 Neither perpetuation of past discrimination, as suggested by
the school desegregation decisions, nor the foreseeability of disparate effects, as proposed by some commentators, were included in
the list.
Subsequent decisions have reaffirmed Davis and Arlington
Heights.4 6 Outside of the traditionally plaintiff-favored areas of
schools 4 7 and jury selection, 48 plaintiffs have established a racially
discriminatory motive in very few of the contested intent cases decided by the Supreme Court since Davis. The two noteworthy victories outside these areas both related to voting.4 9
Since Davis, the intent standard has come to cast an even larger
44 Id. at n.13.
45 Id. at 267-68.
46 E.g., City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980).
47 See Washington v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457 (1982) (initiative
which prohibited school boards from requiring any student to attend a school other than
the school geographically nearest or next-nearest his place of residence, but which contained exceptions permitting school boards to assign students away from their neighborhood schools for virtually all purposes required by their educational policies except
racial desegregation, violated equal protection clause); Columbus Bd. ofEduc. v. Penick,
443 U.S. 449 (record supported lower courts' findings that school board's conduct was
animated by a segregative purpose), reh'g denied, 444 U.S. 887 (1979); Dayton Bd. of
Educ. v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526 (school board's failure to fulfill its affirmative duty to
eradicate effects of dual school system and tendency of its conduct to perpetuate or
increase segregation rendered the current systemwide segregation properly traceable to
purposefully dual system of the 1950s and to subsequent acts of intentional discrimination), reh'g denied, 444 U.S. 887 (1979).
48 See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (To establish prima fade case of purposeful discrimination in selection of the petit jury, the defendant must show that he is a
member of a cognizable racial group, that the prosecutor has exercised peremptory
challenges to remove from the venire members of defendant's race, and that relevant
circumstances raise an inference that the prosecutor used his challenges to exclude the
veniremen from the petit jury on account of their race.); Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S.
482 (1977) (prima facie case of racial discrimination established by a showing that, while
the population of the county was 79.1% Mexican-American, over an 11-year period only
39% of the persons summoned for grand jury service were Mexican-American).
49 See Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222 (1985) (provision in Alabama Constitution disenfranchising persons convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude, even
though neutral on its face, was originally motivated by desire to discriminate against
blacks); Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613 (record sustained district court's findings that atlarge electoral system in Burke County, Georgia was being maintained for invidious purpose of diluting voting strength of black population), reh'g denied, 459 U.S. 889 (1982).
But see City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980) (finding no discriminatory purpose
behind the city's at-large method of selecting its commissioners).
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shadow over race discrimination law. Although the Court still adheres to the disparate impact standard in Title VII cases, 50 it has
extended the intent requirement of fourteenth amendment equal
protection cases to fifteenth amendment voting rights51 claims, thirteenth amendment "badge or incident of slavery" claims, 52 antidiscrimination legislation in the areas of contract 53 and, to a more
limited extent, federally assisted programs. 54 Moreover, because of
the Court's holding that a remedial race-conscious measure by a
state governmental body is permissible only upon a finding of past
discrimination by that governmental unit, 55 the intent standard is
now relevant in most fourteenth amendment affirmative action
cases.
Many cases decided under the Davis intent standard are disturbing,5 6 but perhaps the most troubling to date is McCleskey v.
Kemp. 5 7 Warren McCleskey was sentenced to death for murder in
Georgia and challenged his death sentence as racially discriminatory. The most important evidence he proffered to demonstrate
that Georgia's capital sentencing system is administered in a racially
discriminatory manner was the Baldus study. 58 Baldus examined
over 2000 murder cases that occurred in Georgia during the 1970s.
The raw data showed large disparities in the imposition of the death
penalty, disparities based upon the victim's race. To rule out the
50 The Supreme Court modified the Griggs rule in several respects that are disadvantageous to plaintiffs. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
51 City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980).
52
City of Memphis v. Greene, 451 U.S. 100, reh'g denied, 452 U.S. 955 (1981).
53 General Bldg. Contractors Ass'n v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375 (1982).
54
In Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582 (1983), four Justices
expressed the view that Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d to
2000d-7, which prohibits racial discrimination in federally assisted programs, requires
proof of intent. Justice White disagreed with this interpretation but did agree, in a crucial vote, that a private plaintiff should recover only injunctive, noncompensatory relief
for disparate impact claims. Justices Stevens, Brennan, and Blackmun supported an impact standard under Title VI on the grounds that agency regulations adopted it.
55 City of Richmond v.J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989). But see Metro Broadcasting Inc. v. FCC, 110 S. Ct. 2997 (1990) (benign race-conscious measures may be
mandated by Congress without a finding of past discrimination.).
56 See City of Memphis v. Greene, 451 U.S. 100, reh'g denied, 452 U.S. 955 (1981)
(rejecting a § 1982 attack on Memphis decision to close a road that had the effect of
keeping blacks from passing through a white neighborhood). Disturbing effects of Davis
are not limited to race cases; Davis also governs constitutional sex discrimination claims.
See Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979) (finding no discriminatory purpose
behind Massachusetts civil service preference for veterans despite strong gender effects
and a history of gender discrimination in the state civil service); Geduldig v. Aiello, 417
U.S. 484 (1974) (no intentional sex discrimination in excluding pregnancy from coverage of otherwise comprehensive disability insurance plan).
57 481 U.S. 279, reh'g denied, 482 U.S. 920 (1987).
58 See DAVID C. BALDUS, GEORGE WOODWORTH & CHARLES A. PULASKI, EQUALJUSTICE AND THE DEATH PENALTY (1990) [hereinafter BALDUS STUDY].
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possibility of spurious correlations, Baldus subjected his data to exhaustive analysis, considering 230 variables that might have been
hypothesized to explain the disparities on nonracial grounds. 59
Controlling for nonracial variables, Baldus estimated that defendants charged with killing white victims were more than four times
as likely to be sentenced to death than defendants charged with killing black victims. 6 0 Black defendants accused of killing white victims were the most likely to be condemned. McCleskey also offered
evidence to show Georgia's extraordinary legacy of a race-conscious
61
criminal justice system.
After reciting this evidence and accepting the validity of the
Baldus study, Justice Powell's majority opinion noted that statistical
disparities ordinarily must be "stark" to be accepted as the sole
proof of discriminatory intent.6 2 The Court then refused to
broaden the category of cases in which less extreme impact is
deemed sufficient proof of intent. Justice Powell reaffirmed the necessity of showing discriminatory purpose, explaining that a showing of awareness of racially disparate consequences was inadequate;
only a showing that the legislature acted "because of" an anticipated racial effect would suffice.65 Because McCleskey had not
made such a showing, the Court rejected his equal protection claim.
B.

Commentary on the Intent Standard

Early commentary on the role of discriminatory purpose in
equal protection cases argued that legislative motive was a proper
subject of inquiry. 64 This focus was partly the result of the Supreme
Court's refusal to examine motive in Palmer v. Thompson 6 5 and partly
the result of larger questions concerning the role of motive in constitutional law.6 6 But after the Court decided Davis, commentators
quickly shifted gears; intent was certainly relevant, but that did not
mean that the intent standard constituted a comprehensive approach to all discrimination.
Dissatisfaction with the discriminatory purpose standard has
two distinct facets. One is the difficulty of proving discriminatory
59
60
61
62

Id at 42-45 (discussing research design, sample, and data).

Id at 154.
481 U.S. at 329-32 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 293.
63 Id. at 298-99.
64
Paul Brest, Palmerv. Thompson: An Approach to the Problem of UnconstitutionalLegislative Motive, 1971 Sup. GT. REV. 95, 116; John Hart Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in ConstitutionalLaw, 79 YALE LJ. 1205 (1970).
65
403 U.S. 217 (1971).
66
See, e.g., Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principlesof ConstitutionalLaw, 73 HARv.
L. REV. 1, 33 (1959).
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purpose. 6 7 Even if the discriminatory purpose standard reflects a
correct view of what constitutes discrimination-decisions made
"because of" race-it may be a poor vehicle for identifying instances of such decisions. 68 Several commentators have argued that
sophisticated discriminators will conceal their purposes. 6 9 Drawing
on developing social science data concerning the prevalence and
manifestations of unconscious racism, 70 recent writers have contended that race-based decisionmaking is common, and have
pointed out the impossibility of adducing evidence that a decision
was made "because of" race when the decisionmaker himself is un71
aware that race influenced his choice.
A second facet of the anti-Davis commentary argues that intentional, "because of" race discrimination provides a too limited vision of the goal of equality embodied in the fourteenth amendment.
Most broadly, Alan Freeman has argued that intent tests wrongly
adopt a perpetrator's perspective on discrimination; from the victim's perspective, effects are of greater importance. 72 Others have
asserted that avoidance of particular effects, such as subordination,
67
See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg, DisproportionateImpact and Illicit Motive: Theories of
ConstitutionalAdjudication, 52 N.Y.U. L. REv. 36, 114-16 (1977); Kenneth L. Karst, The
Costs of Motive-CenteredInquiry, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1163 (1978); MichaelJ. Perry, The
Disproportionate Impact Theory of Racial Discrimination, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 540, 548-49
(1977); Robert G. Schwemm, From Washington to Arlington Heights and Beyond- Discriminatory Purpose in Equal Protection Litigation, 1977 U. ILL. L. REV. 961, 1001; Larry G. Simon, Racially Preudiced Governmental Actions: A Motivation Theory of the ConstitutionalBan
Against Racial Discrimination, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 1041 (1978).
68
Cf David A. Strauss, DiscriminatoryIntent and the Taming of Brown, 56 U. Ci. L.
Rav. 935, 956 (1989) (arguing that the discriminatory intent standard "leads either to
incoherence or to an inquiry that is no less amorphous, and potentially as threatening to
existing institutions, as the rival conceptions of discrimination that Washington v. Davis
rejected.").
69
Eisenberg, supra note 67, at 47-48; Perry, supra note 67, at 551; Schwemm, supra
note 67, at 1031.
70
A burgeoning literature (spanning Freudians, cognitive psychologists, and sociologists) documents the rise of the aversive racist, a person whose ambivalent racial
attitudes lead her to deny her own prejudice and express it indirectly, covertly, and often
unconsciously. Although terminology varies with the discipline-as does the explanation of the origin of unconscious racism-all subfields document the existence and prevalence of the same phenomenon. See Sheri Lynn Johnson, Unconscious Racism and the
CriminalLaw, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 1016, 1027-29 (1988) (reviewing the literature).
71 See KENNETH L. KARST, BELONGING TO AMERICA 156 (1989); Johnson, supra note
70; Sheri Lynn Johnson, Black Innocence and the WhiteJuiy, 83 MicH. L. REv. 1611, 1650
(1985) [hereinafter Johnson, Black Innocence]; Randall L. Kennedy, McCleskey v. Kemp:
Race, Capital Punishment, and the Supreme Court, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1388, 1419 (1988);
Charles R. Lawrence, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection:Reckoning With Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987); Gayle Binion, "Intent" andEqual Protection:A Reconsideration, 1983 Sup. CT. REV. 397, 442; Paul Brest, The Supreme Court, 1975 Term-Foreword:
In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARv. L. REV. 1, 6-8 (1976); Karst, supra
note 67, at 1165; Strauss, supra note 68, at 960.
72 Alan D. Freeman, LegiTtimizing RacialDiscrimination ThroughAntidiscriminationLaw: A
CriticalReview of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1049 (1978).
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stigma, second-class citizenship, or encouragement of prejudice, are
encompassed in the constitutional ideal, and that those effects
73
should therefore be included in the definition of discrimination.
Still others have argued that, while a pure impact standard might be
unmanageable, if limited, racially disproportionate impact should be
included in the definition of discrimination. Candidates for the limiting principle include foreseeability of disparate impact, 74 proximate causation of disparate impact, 7 5 and disparate impact that
results from perpetuation of past discrimination. 76 Alternatively,
some critics have contended that disparate racial effects should give
rise to heightened scrutiny in all cases, but that the state's defensive
77
burden should be lower than in purposeful discrimination cases.
C.

The Data

Most criticism of Washington v. Davis argues or assumes that the
intent standard will be difficult to satisfy. There have been no attempts to systematically study cases decided under the intent standard. To fill that gap, we decided initially to examine all district
court opinions. Data about the absolute number and rate of plaintiffs' victories is obviously relevant to the intent standard's operation. Having made arguments critical of Davis ourselves, 78 we
expected to find few successes. More specifically, we expected to
find the absolute number of winning racial discrimination plaintiffs
to be low, but were less clear about what rates of success to predict.
Uninformed intuition would predict low success rates as well. But
selection effect theory suggested that success rates at trial might not
vary greatly from other classes of claims, 79 and that the unfavorable
substantive law would instead be reflected in fewer filings.
Later we expanded our inquiry to courts of appeals cases, in
part because we were concerned about whether district court judgments were frequently reversed; the possibility of frequent reversals
could cast doubt upon any conclusions we might draw about plaintiff success. In assessing the stability of results on appeal, we were
primarily concerned with affirmances and reversals, but we also ex80
amined rates of concurrences, dissents, and per curiam opinions.
73 See Strauss, supra note 68, at 941-46 (reviewing these conceptions of discrimination and citing their proponents.).
74 See, e.g., Note, DiscriminatoryPurpose andMens Rea: The TorturedArgument of Invidious
Intent, 93 YALE LJ. 111, 129 (1983) (authored by Pamela S. Karlan).
75 See Eisenberg, supra note 67.
76 See Brest, supra note 71, at 31-36; Owen Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause,

5 PHIL. & PuB. AFF. 107, 154-55 (1976).

77
78

79
80

See Perry, supra note 67, at 559-60, 563; cf. Gunther, supra note 2, at 20-24.
Eisenberg, supra note 67; Johnson, supra note 70.
See Priest & Klein, supra note 8; infra text accompanying notes 125-30.
Our decision to consider courts of appeals decisions was also motivated by the
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The cases analyzed stem from a search for all federal appellate
and district court published opinions fromJune 7, 1976 to February
6, 1988, a period of 140 months, that cite either of the two leading
intent cases-Washington v. Davis or Arlington Heights. WESTLAW

searches located every opinion citing either case and we eliminated
from the study cases that lacked a constitutional race-based intent
claim.8 ' Remaining cases were read and coded for many factors, including basic identification data such as district and circuit, subject
matter, bases for relief alleged by plaintiffs, bases for granting or
denying relief relied on by the courts, procedural posture, the existence of dissenting opinions, relief granted, and other items. This
yielded 140 appellate opinions and 176 district court opinions.
II
VOLUME, SUCCESS, AND OTHER CHARACTERISTICS OF

INTENT CASES
The data can address concerns about the difficulty of satisfying
the intent standard in at least two ways: by the success rate of those
cases filed and by the total volume of filings.8 2 The volume of intent
claim activity suggests that plaintiffs infrequently invoke the Constitution to attack racial discrimination. Intent claims succeed at rates
lower than other classes of litigation, though not at shockingly lower
rates.
A.

Criteria for Assessing Volume and Success Rates
Our data, like almost all case data used in legal analysis, consist

desire to expand the sample size, but the completed study now suggests that combining
district and appellate court data is unlikely to be helpful in this way.
81 The searches used were:
WASHINGTON +S DAVIS & (INTENT! PURPOSE!) & DISCRIMIN! &
DATE(AFTER 6/7/76), and
ARLINGTON +S HEIGHTS & (INTENTI PURPOSEI) & DISCRIMI 7 WASHINGTON +S DAVIS & DATE(AFTER 6/7/76).
The searches were conducted on February 6 and 7, 1988. Some cases decided just
before the search date were not yet available as full opinions. These were added to the
sample later. For possible differences in the availability of unpublished opinions among
WESTLAW, LEXis, and the Administrative Office of the United States Courts, see Memorandum from Peter W. Martin to Donna Stienstra, Stewart Schwab, Ted Eisenberg, and
Other Interested Folks (Mar. 6, 1987) (on file at CornellLaw Review) (discussing results of
LEXIS searches for unpublished decisions by circuit).
82 For discussions of definitions of success, see Theodore Eisenberg & Stewart J.
Schwab, The Reality of ConstitutionalTort Litigation, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 641, 676-77 (1987)
[hereinafter Eisenberg & Schwab, Reality]; Theodore Eisenberg & Stewart J. Schwab,
What Shapes Perceptionsof the FederalCourt System?, 56 U. Cni. L. REV. 501 (1989) [hereinafter Eisenberg & Schwab, What Shapes Perceptions?];StewartJ. Schwab & Theodore Eisenberg, ExplainingConstitutionalTort Litigation: The Influence of the Attorney Fees Statute and the
Government as Defendant, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 719, 726-28 (1988) [hereinafter Schwab &
Eisenberg, Explaining].
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of published opinions, not all case filings. Published opinions may
not be a representative sample of all race-based intent cases filed,
and in some respects, pointed out below, they surely are not. The
ideal methodology for studying plaintiff successes in intent claims
presumably would be representative of all trial court level activity.
Even such a study should be supplemented by an investigation of
prefiling primary behavior. But for many issues throughout the
83
legal system, published opinions are all we have.
Fortunately, studies of similar cases are available that contain
both filing and opinion data bearing on volume and success. These
studies, together with case filing information published by the Administrative Office of the United States Courts,8 4 allow us to draw
reasonable inferences about filing levels and the total number of
successful cases from the published opinion intent data. Before
proceeding, it is helpful to clarify the terminology we employ in referring to results from previous studies.
Three classes of overlapping cases should be distinguished: (1)
race-based intent cases, consisting of constitutional claims against
governments and officials, (2) "civil rights" cases, a category of
cases in the classification scheme maintained by the Administrative
Office,8 5 and (3) "constitutional tort" cases, cases brought under 42
U.S.C. § 1983. These categories are not mutually exclusive and we
do not seek to classify claims in a single category. Indeed, a single
claim (such as a racially motivated decision to terminate a government program) can fit into all three categories. But since each category contains cases that do not fit in the other two categories, the
constitutional tort and civil rights groups are not perfect proxies for
intent claims. They are the closest subject matter areas about which
substantial data are available. Although many of our results do not
depend on studies of civil rights and constitutional tort cases, these
studies enrich our findings. We note the differences in these categories, thereby enabling the reader to judge whether the inferences we
draw from studies of "civil rights" and "constitutional tort" cases
are reasonable.
Intent cases can arise in any setting, from school desegregation
83 For example, when Congress debated recent civil rights legislation, studies of
appellate opinions dominated the empirical picture being drawn. 3 Hearings on H.R.
4000, The Civil Rights Act of 1990, House Comm. on Education and Labor, 101st Cong., 2d
Sess., 240, 279, 454 (1990) [hereinafter Hearings].
84 For discussion of the Administrative Office data, see Eisenberg & Schwab, Reality, supra note 82, at 653.
85 See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, GUIDE TO JUDICIARY POLICIES AND PROCEDURES transmittal 64, vol. XI (Mar. 1, 1985) [hereinafter A.O. GUIDE]. Our terminology in this article differs from the Administrative Office's. The Administrative Office
refers to the category we are labeling "civil rights" as "other civil rights." Id at 11-88
(Exhibit J).
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to prison conditions, from actions against the police to claims involving the criminal justice system. They transcend most traditional
doctrinal legal boundaries. They may be (as in the program termination example above) but need not be what we are calling "civil
rights" and "constitutional tort" cases. For example, a criminal defendant's assertion of an intentionally racially biased jury is an intent claim, but is neither a civil rights claim (in the sense used by the
Administrative Office) nor a constitutional tort claim.
The Administrative Office's categorization of "civil rights"
cases is important because data about success in each Administrative
Office category are available. As the most general civil rights category maintained by the Administrative Office, it includes cases filed
under many federal civil rights statutes.8 6 Since section 1983 (constitutional tort) actions dominate this category,8 7 the civil rights category may be best defined by what it excludes. The term "civil
rights," as used below to refer to Administrative Office data, does
not include most cases raising claims of discrimination in employment, accommodations, or voting, even though common usage of
the term might include such claims.88 The Administrative Office has
a separate category for each of these areas. Many civil rights cases
are intent cases, but many are not.
"Constitutional tort" cases include actions brought under section 1983 against state and local authorities alleging constitutional
89
violations and similar actions brought against federal officials.
Constitutional tort cases substantially overlap with "civil rights"
cases. The constitutional tort category is important because prior
studies establish levels of volume and success for constitutional tort
cases. The results from constitutional tort cases 90 are directly relevant to race-based intent claims, most of which are brought as constitutional tort actions under section 1983.91 The two subclasses of
86
What we are calling the Administrative Office's "civil rights" category includes,
in addition to nonprisoner cases filed under § 1983, nonprisoner cases filed under 42
U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1985, 1988, 2000a and 2000d; fifth amendment claims; claims under
the Economic Opportunities Act (42 U.S.C. § 2701 (1988)); and other unclassified civil
rights cases.
87 The best evidence suggests that about 70% of these "civil rights" cases are
§ 1983 cases. Eisenberg & Schwab, Reality, supra note 82, at 665, 670.
88
See A.O. GuIDE, supra note 85, at 11-45 (Exhibit B).
89
Federal actions are based on Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). Section 1983 actions may not be brought
against federal officials, but the scope of the Bivens-based action is about the same as the
§ 1983 action.
90 Constitutional tort cases are actions brought against state and federal officials
asserting violations of federal law.
91
Eisenberg & Schwab, What Shapes Perceptions?, supra note 82, at 525. Table III
shows that about 20% of constitutional tort claims in three large districts for one year
were discrimination claims (employment and other), and that about 16% of published
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constitutional tort cases that include express discrimination claims
show district court and appellate court success rates that are dose to
the overall constitutional tort success rates.92
B.

Volume

The intent standard's demands might discourage plaintiffs from
bringing intent-based claims. If the intent standard makes cases
more difficult to win, or is perceived to by plaintiffs, the standard
would shift the distribution of cases filed, resulting in fewer filings
than under a less stringent standard. There is already evidence that
discrimination victims are less likely than other victims to bring their
grievances to anyone's attention or to bring them to court.9 3 A legal
standard that discourages victims already reluctant to sue is of special concern.
1. The Number of Intent Cases
One cannot directly observe the national total of intent claims
filings, but it is possible to estimate the number of such filings from
data gathered in this study and in other sources. By using percentages from studies in which both the number of published opinions
and the number of filings are known, we may estimate the number
of intent filings from the known number of intent opinions. Two
such estimates yield a consistent result of relatively few filings.
An estimate based on an actual comparison of district court filings and opinions is available. Siegelman and Donohue studied a
closely related area of law, employment discrimination, in which one
might expect a comparable number of opinions per filing. 9 4 (Indeed, about one-third of district court intent opinions involve employment claims.) They found that about 20 percent of employment
discrimination cases filed lead to district court published opinions. 9 5
Applying the 20 percent rate to the 176 district court opinions we
found yields an estimate of 880 district court filings for the period
constitutional tort opinions in three circuits over a five-year period were discrimination
claims. Id.
92 Id. at 525, Table 3 (combining the employment and other discrimination
categories).
93
KRISTIN BUMILLER, THE CIVIL RIGHTS SocIETY 25-30 (1988); Charles R. Epp,
ConnectingLitigation Levels and Legal Mobilization:ExplainingInterstate Variation in Employment
Civil Rights Litigation, 24 LAw & Soc'y REV. 145, 160 (1990); David Trubek, Austin Sarat,
William L.F. Felstiner, Herbert M. Kritzer &Joel B. Grossman, The Costs of Ordinary Litigation, 31 UCLA L. REV. 72, 87 (1983).
94 Peter Siegelman &JohnJ. Donohue, Studying the Icebergfrom Its Tip: A Comparison
of Published and Unpublished Employment Discrimination Cases, 24 LAw & Soc'y REV. 1133
(1990). Their study covers a long time period, 1972 to 1986, but is limited to cases in
the Northern District of Illinois. Id at 1138.
95 Id. at 1141.
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covered. Dividing by twelve years suggests that about 70 intent
claims, less than one per district, were filed each year. A second
estimate is based on data from a constitutional tort study containing
both opinion data and filing data. It suggests about two filings per
federal district per year. 9 6 By either estimate, the number of district
court filings stating a claim of intentional racial discrimination is
low. 9 7

96
Contrasting the appellate court data with data from the constitutional tort study
provides another estimate of district court filings. Extrapolating back to district court
level filings from the appellate activity requires one to make some assumptions about the
representativeness of the constitutional tort data. District court constitutional tort filing
data from the earlier study are limited to one year of filings in three districts, but the
nonprisoner filing rate in these three districts seems to be reasonably representative of
the national experience for that year. Schwab & Eisenberg, Explaining, supra note 82, at
721 n.8. We must assume it is also representative of a longer time period. Further, we
must assume that the filing/appellate opinion ratio is similar for constitutional tort cases
and for race-based intent claims; the justification for this assumption is that, as noted
above, race-based intent claims are closely related to constitutional tort claims. Using
these two assumptions one can estimate the percentage of the district court docket consisting of race-based intent claims, keeping in mind that this should be treated as a
rough order-of-magnitude estimate.
Nonprisoner constitutional tort claims comprised about 4.3% of federal filings. Eisenberg & Schwab, What Shapes Perceptions?,supra note 82, at 514 (Figure 1), 522 n.59. If
the ratio between filings and appellate opinions is the same for constitutional tort litigation and race-based intent litigation, then 2% of the 4.3%, or about .086% of district
court filings are intent claims. Given that district court filings totaled about 2,411,000
for the period of the study, see infra note 97, .00086 times this number, or 2073, intent
claims would have been filed. This yields an annual total of 173 intent claims, about two
per year per district.
97
One estimate of the volume of race-based intent claims comes from projecting
onto total district court filings the proportion of published district court opinions that
involve race-based intent claims. WESTLAw shows about 95,000 district court opinions
from 1976 to 1988. (The precise number is 97,277 if one includes all WESTL.AW opinions
and 94,476 if one excludes opinions that WESTLAW reports as not published.) The 176
district court intent opinions during the same period thus comprise about .19% of district court opinions. If they comprise the same percentage of filings, there would have
been 382 intent filings per year for the 12 years of this study, about four per federal
district per year and less than one per federal district judge per year.
The filing estimates are as follows: FromJuly 1, 1977 to February 28, 1988, district
court filings totaled about 2,411,000. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, ANNUAL REPORTS OF DIRECTOR. We have reduced 1988 filings by one-third to reflect the end of this
study not coinciding with the end of the Administrative Office's fiscal year. If race-based
intent claims comprise .19% of total filings, there would have been 4581 intent filings or
about 382 per year. For 1982, a year in the middle of this study, there were 511 authorized federal district court judgeships. 1982 ANNUAL REPORT at 476 (Table X-1).
This estimate from the fraction of published opinions probably substantially overestimates the total number of intent filings. Federal court dockets contain surprisingly
high percentages of default judgments, government payment program filings, and social
security cases. Marc Galanter, The Life and Times of the Big Six, Or, the Federal Courts Since
the Good Old Days, 1988 Wis. L. REv. 921. These routine collection cases and minor
administrative law actions are very unlikely to lead to published opinions. Large groups
of filings that do not lead to opinions inflate the number of estimated intent filings,
because the .19%o figure should be multiplied by some number substantially smaller
than the total number of filings. In addition, one suspects that intent cases are more
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Intent cases are also a small fraction of the appellate docket. A
WESTLAW search provides another estimate of the level of appellate activity. WESTLAW shows about 149,000 appellate opinions
from 1976 to 1988.98 Using this figure for the total, the 140 intent
opinions comprise about. 1 percent of published appellate opinions.
Even if we somehow missed many intent opinions, or should adjust
the crude WESTLAW figures, intent opinions would not comprise
more than the higher .2 percent estimate.
Thus, using estimates of the number of race-based claims filed
or the proportion of the district and appellate court dockets occupied by these claims, constitutional race-based intent litigation is
relatively rare. Adding state court intent opinions would not materially affect these results; for all states, we found a total of only fiftythree such opinions for the twelve years of this study. 9 9
2. Interpreting the Number of Filings
Assessing whether the level of filings or number of trial successes is "low" requires comparing the number of filings with the
number of discriminatory acts engaged in by governmental bodies
and their agents. This in turn requires a definition of discrimination. If one's definition is broad enough to include governmental
actions that exacerbate or perpetuate existing inequalities, then
there is no doubt that a great deal of discrimination exists and no
doubt that the intent standard will not capture most of it, since it is
not designed to do so.
If the Supreme Court's definition of action taken "because of"
rather than merely "in spite of" race is used, the amount of governmental discrimination is harder to assess. Nevertheless, there is reason to believe that the amount is far from insignificant.
Contemporary data on racial attitudes document the persistence of
prejudice. 10 0 Social preference studies reveal a relatively stable pattern of aversion towards blacks.1 0 ' Many negative stereotypes perlikely than other cases to lead to opinions. The Siegelman and Donohue data, supra note
94, support this suspicion because a 20% opinion rate applied to all filings would yield
over 500,000 opinions for the years studied, not the 95,000 observed on WESTLAW.
98 WESTLAW shows 149,382 total opinions, of which 149,304 were published.
99 Twenty-eight of these opinions involved challenges to criminal convictions, with
the bulk of these (19) being challenges to jury selection procedures. Of course, many
more such challenges are made than appear in published opinions. Such intent claims,
possible in a huge number of criminal prosecutions, should be accounted for separately.
100 See HOWARD SCHUMAN, CHARLOTTE STEEH, & LAWRENCE BOBO, RACIAL ATITrUDES
IN AMERICA: TRENDS AND INTERPRETATIONS (1985); David German, Black and White in
America, Newsweek, Mar. 7, 1988, at 23; Poll Finds Whites Use Stereotypes: Racial Groups
Characterizedin Mostly Negative Terms, N.Y. Times,Jan. 10, 1991, at B10, col 3.
101 Johnson, Black Innocence, supra note 71, at 1647 n.172-73 and accompanying text
(reviewing the literature).
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sist, although they are somewhat less extreme and widespread than
in the 1950s and 1960s.1 02 Encouragement that might be drawn
from the decrease in negative stereotypes must be tempered with
caution: a study designed to test whether the declining social acceptability of racial prejudice has tainted the responses in the newer
polls concluded that there has indeed been some fading in negative
attitudes, but also some faking on the part of those polled.10 3 Negative feelings also persist, although the predominant cast of those
feelings has changed in the last twenty years.' 0 4 Dominative racists,
those who express bigoted beliefs and hostility openly and frequently through physical force, are now rare; aversive racists,
prejudiced persons who do not want to associate with blacks but
rarely will say so, are more common.10 5
Documentation of persistent widespread prejudice does not by
itself demonstrate the existence of widespread discrimination.
Where discrimination is illegal or socially disapproved, social scientists predict that it will be practiced only when it is possible to do so
covertly and indirectly.' 0 6 Thus, the social and legal sanctions
against prejudice reduce the frequency with which prejudice will be
expressed in discriminatory behavior. However, those sanctions
also decrease the proportion of discriminatory behavior that will be
clearly identifiable as discriminatory. Moreover, as we come to a
greater understanding of unconscious racism, it seems increasingly
likely that measures of prejudiced attitudes will, at least in some settings, underestimate the number of potential discriminators; there may
be many persons who report (and even believe they have) benign
attitudes who nevertheless will act harmftilly toward minorities be07
cause of race.'
In addition to the attitudinal data, which strongly suggest the
likelihood of substantial amounts of racial discrimination in the sociId. at 1647 n.174-76 and accompanying text (reviewing the literature).
Harold Sigall & Richard Page, Current Stereotypes: A Little Fading,A Little Faking, 18
J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 247 (1971).
104 There have been related changes in the nature of discrimination litigation. As
more workers benefited from Title VII's ban on discrimination, more opportunities
arose for on the job discrimination. In recent years, challenges to hiring practices have
been eclipsed by challenges to termination decisions. See Prather v. Dayton Power &
Light Co., 918 F.2d 1255, 1257 n.3 (6th Cir. 1990) ("Over 43% of all Title VII cases
involve discharge, a far greater percentage than that attributed to any other issue.")
(citing EEOC data); John J. Donohue & Peter Siegelman, The ChangingNature of Employ102
103

ment DiscriminationLitigation, 43 STAN. L. REV. 983, 1015-19 (1991). Some evidence suggests that discrimination levels, however substantial, have declined. Id. at 1001-03. For
a discussion of the question whether job discrimination victims have increased their propensity to sue, see id. at 1003-04.
105 Johnson, Black Innocence, supra note 71, at 1649 (reviewing the literature).
106
GORDON W. ALLPORT, THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE 56-57 (1954).
107 See Lawrence, supra note 71.
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ety at large, there is some direct evidence of discrimination itself,
although such evidence is much more difficult to collect. First, the
Baldus study of 2000 murder cases, although rejected by the
Supreme Court in McCleskey, constitutes powerful evidence of pervasive racial discrimination.1 08 After controlling for 230 other variables, Baldus found that defendants charged with killing white
victims were more than four times as likely to be condemned to
death than were defendants charged with killing black victims.
Baldus's study is powerful for two reasons: first, the discrimination
uncovered involved public, rather than private decisionmakers; and
second, the discriminatory effect was so strong that it most likely
shows that white decisionmakers devalued the importance of black
lives and black interests-a devaluation that would seem likely to
affect many other political decisions, including allocation of governmental services. Even if, as the Supreme Court held, Baldus's study
did not establish discrimination in McCleskey's case, it establishes a
pattern of race-based decisionmaking across many cases. 10 9
A second source of evidence about discrimination comes from
experiments designed to investigate racially discriminatory behavior. In a variety of field studies that simulate real life situations, researchers report discrimination, 1 0 as do social scientists engaged in
controlled laboratory studies on the influence of race upon white
subjects' guilt attributions."' A third piece of evidence is the rise in
108

109
tion.

supra note 58.
Gross and Mauro's study of death penalty cases finds similar racial discriminaSAMUEL R. GROSS & ROBERT MAURO, DEATH & DISCRIMINATION: RACIAL DISPARIBALDUS STUDY,

TIES IN CAPITAL SENTENCING 53 (1989).

110 See, e.g., Ian Ayres, FairDriving: Gender and Race Discriminationin Retail CarNegotiation, 104 HARV. L. REV. 817 (1991); William E. Schmidt, White Men Get Better Deals on Cars,
Study Finds, N.Y. Times, Dec. 13, 1990, at A26, col. 4 (reporting Ayres study); Donald G.
Dutton & Robert A. Lake, Threat of Own Prudice and Reverse Discriminationin Interracial
Situations, 28 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 94 (1973) (whites who had been told
that their responses to a questionnaire had shown them to be racially prejudiced gave
more money to black panhandlers than to white panhandlers, but whites who had been
told that their response showed them to be egalitarian gave less money to black panhandlers than to white panhandlers); Samuel L. Gaertner,John F. Dovidio & GaryJohnson,
Race of Victim, Nonresponsive Bystanders and Helping Behavior, 117 J. SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 69
(1982) (white subjects in the presence of passive bystanders helped black emergency
victims less quickly than white emergency victims);Jack P. Lipton, Racism in theJury Box:
The HispanicDefendant, 5 HISPANICJ. BEHAVIORAL Sci. 275 (1983) (students who believed
they were determining the punishment of a fellow student discriminated against otherrace students); Sukdeb Mukhergee, Sashi Shukla, Joanne Woodle, Arnold Rosen & Silvia

Olarte, Misdiagnosisof Schizophrenia in Bipolar Patients:A Multiethnic Comparison, 140 AM.J.
PSYCHIATRY 1571 (1983) (black and Hispanic mental patients more likely to be diagnosed as schizophrenic even when other variables are controlled for); William Yee, Comment on Schulman's Article, 81 AM. J. Soc. 629 (1975) (discussing finding that white
subjects delivered more painful shocks to failing black confederate than to failing white

confederate).
111 Johnson, Black Innocence, sup-a note 71, at 1625-40 (reviewing the literature).
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racially motivated violence and campus harassment of minorities.1 12
These well-publicized events suggest that even old-fashioned discrimination has hardly been eradicated. The campus discrimination
is particularly illuminating because college students, younger and
better educated than the general population, are less likely than the
general population to engage in racial discrimination.' 1 3
Assessing the meaning of the level of intent claim activity requires accounting not only for the level of discrimination, but also
for alternative methods of bringing discrimination claims. If racebased intent claims find other outlets, there is less cause for concern
about the intent standard's effects. Much of the subject matter of
constitutional race litigation overlaps with federal statutes. Governmental discrimination in employment, housing, and voting violates
not only the fourteenth amendment but federal statutory commands
as well. 1 4 In counting the number of intent cases, we include cases
in which there is a statutory claim as well as a constitutional claim.
Thus, a case seeking statutory redress of discrimination is not in our
study only if no constitutional intent claim was made. In employment, the area with by far the most cases of the three, 1 5 there are
substantial advantages to including an intent claim along with any
claim of disparate impact; 1 16 these cases would be counted in our
study. Cases that allege only disparate impact, which would not
show up in our study, are a small fraction of employment litigation. 117 For the many areas of life not covered by statutes, intent
claims against the government can be brought only as constitutional
claims. Thus, we are "counting" most of the legal means of redress
for intentional, official racial discrimination.
We conclude that the level of underlying "because of" discrimination is substantial even if not quantifiable. If there is significant
governmental race discrimination in the society, constitutional litigation is not directly redressing much of it.
112 Steve France, Hate Goes to College, A.B.A. J., July 1990, at 44; Isabel Wilkerson,
RacialHarassmentAltering Blacks' Choices on Colleges, N.Y. Times, May 9, 1990, at 1, col. 5.
113 JAMES M. JONES, PREJUDICE AND RACISM 74, 78 (1972).
114 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1988) (employment); 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3606
(1988) (housing); 42 U.S.C. § 1973-1973aa-6 (1988) (voting).
115
See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, ANNUAL REPORTS OF DIRECTOR (any year

since the mid-1970s).
116 Title VII, the major federal employment discrimination statute, requires state
and federal presuit administrative steps, prohibits punitive or full compensatory damages, and disallows jury trials. See Theodore Eisenberg & Stewart Schwab, The Importance
of Section 1981, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 596, 602 n.38 (1988).
117 An American Bar Foundation sample of employment discrimination cases found

that, in 1985-1987, pure disparate impact cases comprised only 1.84% of employment
discrimination cases. Donohue & Siegelman, supra note 104, at 998 n.57. A seemingly
broader category, encompassing all nonanimus-based discrimination, comprised only
10%o of employment discrimination cases. Id. at 1019.
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Success Rates

Predicting a low success rate from a burdensome legal standard
is risky, as is inferring the burdensomeness of the standard from
success rates. A straightforward prediction is that if the intent standard is difficult to satisfy, intent plaintiffs would lose much more
often than they would win. But success rates may vary depending
on the point in the process that one examines. By the time cases
reach trial, parties' settlement behavior will temper the effect of a
higher legal standard. 1 18 Civil rights cases filed under federal statutes that do not require a showing of intent are more likely to settle
than civil rights cases requiring a showing of intent. 1 9 This lesser
rate of settlements may not be observable in published opinions,
however, either at the district court or appellate levels. In the same
study showing that impact-based civil rights claims settle more
often, no significant difference was observed in the success rate at
trial between intent-based and impact-based claims. 120 If the intent
standard leads to less success for plaintiffs, it may show up only in
settlement rates.
1. Success in the District Courts
In the district court opinions, plaintiffs prevailed in forty-seven
of 118 (40 percent) cases with an outcome clearly identifiable as success or failure. For purposes of comparison with other classes of
cases, it is difficult to know what to make of the 40 percent figure.
The district court opinions are not a representative cross-section of
district court level activity. Settlement, the modal outcome for most
21
litigation, is vastly underrepresented in opinions.'
It is more useful to isolate a subset of the opinion cases, those
resolved at trial, and compare intent claimants' success rates with
trial success rates from other studies. A rough calculation suggests
that the opinions represent a substantial fraction of all tried intent
claims. Assuming 140 intent filings per year 12 2 and a 15 percent
rate of trial,12 3 there would be 21 tried cases per year, or 252 for the
twelve years of the study. The opinion data contain 100 tried cases,
118

See Priest & Klein, supra note 8.

119 Stewart Schwab & Theodore Eisenberg, The Influence of Judicial Background
on Settling and Winning Cases & A Study of the Disputing Pyramid (1990) (unpublished
paper) (on file at Cornell Law Review).
120

121

Id.
Siegelman & Donohue, supra note 94, at 1155 (Table 7).

122 This is twice the number of the estimate based on the Siegelman & Donohue
data, the only study to directly compare district court filings and district court opinions.
See supra notes 94-95 and accompanying text.
123

Schwab & Eisenberg, Explaining,supra note 82, at 733 (Table IV), 784 (Table B2).
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or about 40 percent of all of the estimated number of trials.' 24 By
any reasonable estimate, the opinions comprise a substantial fraction, though admittedly not a random sample, of all tried intent
cases.
What trial success rate do the opinions show? One hundred of
176 district court opinions indicate disposition of the intent claim at
trial. Eighty-nine yielded clear rulings on intent claims, with plaintiffs prevailing in 40 percent of the cases (36 cases). (Coincidentally,
this is the same success rate as in the larger pool of all opinion cases,
those both tried and not tried.)
This 40 percent success rate can be compared to success rates
in other studies of trials. In the most comprehensive study of district court trials, the plaintiff won in about 46 percent of the
cases. 12 5 It is unlikely that published intent opinions underestimate
trial success in the district courts; if published opinions are biased in
any direction, it is probably toward overestimating plaintiff success,
because plaintiff success means a finding of governmental misconduct. Our district court data thus suggest that intent cases fare
slightly worse at trial than do other causes of action. This is consistent with an earlier finding that civil rights plaintiffs do worse at trial
than do other plaintiffs.' 26 It seems unlikely that greater than normal success in settlements somehow makes up for low trial success
rates, 2 7 so our direct district court data point toward modestly
lower rates of success in filed cases. 128
The picture differs when intent trial success rates are compared
with trial success rates in other studies of constitutional tort and
civil rights cases. A study of all nonprisoner constitutional court
cases filed in one year in three districts showed a plaintiff trial success rate of 27 percent. 12 9 Administrative Office data show civil
rights plaintiffs succeed in 33 percent of trials.' 3 0 Thus, even if in124
Siegelman & Donohue found published opinions to reflect an even higher percentage of all trials. Siegelman & Donohue, supra note 94, at 1155.
125 Theodore Eisenberg, The Relationship between Success Rates before Trial and at Tial,

154J. ROYAL STATISTICAL SOC'Y, Series A, Part 1, 111 (1991). This 46% figure results
from taking a weighted mean of all the case categories of the Administrative Office of the
United States Courts.
126

Theodore Eisenberg, Litigation Models and Trial Outcomes in Civil Rights andPrisoner

Cases, 77 GEO. Lj. 1567, 1579-80 (1989); Schwab & Eisenberg, Explaining,supra note 82.
127
The trial success rate in all civil rights cases is slightly lower than the success rate
in published district court intent opinions. But this may not reflect a difference in overall success at trial, if, as we hypothesize, plaintiff success at trial is overestimated by published opinions. Fertile comparison to other civil rights cases would require data on
other published civil rights district court opinions, which we have not gathered.
128 In state court opinions, plaintiffs prevailed in only three of 32 cases with clear
outcomes.
129
Schwab & Eisenberg, Explaining,supra note 82, at 729 n.37.
130

Eisenberg, supra note 8, at 357; Eisenberg, supra note 125, at 115 app. A.
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tent claims fare somewhat worse at trial than non-civil rights cases,
they do not fare noticeably worse at trial than cases in closely related
areas; if anything, intent cases fare slighdy better. In any case, one
cannot support concerns about the intent standard's influence on
case outcomes based on observable plaintiff success rates.
The filing estimates computed above allow a crude estimate of
the number of successful intent claims. We estimate one to two intent filings per year per district. 3 1 Using the success rate of plaintiffs in constitutional tort litigation, 3 2 we estimate less than one
successful intent claim per year per district, including cases that
settle.
2. Success on Appeal
The appellate data can be measured in two ways: one can examine either reversal rates or absolute success on appeal. The first
measure takes into account who won in the district court. The second measure simply examines who wins on appeal, regardless of
who the appellant was.
Reversal Rates. Data from a study on constitutional tort cases
provide appellate success rates with which to compare intent-based
race claims. Figure 1 summarizes the results and limits the sample
to cases in which there is a single clear appellant and a clear victor
with respect to the intent claim on appeal.
The Figure shows that nonprisoner constitutional tort litigants
succeeded in 38 percent of the 395 published opinion cases they
appealed. Their opponents succeeded in 48 percent of the 89 cases
they appealed. 13 3 Constitutional tort cases are more volatile on appeal than the randomly selected control group of non-civil rights
cases; plaintiffs appealing in this group prevailed in 35 percent of
the 411 cases while defendants prevailed in 33 percent of the 222
cases they appealed.
For both plaintiffs and defendants, intent-based race claims are
more difficult to overturn than either constitutional tort cases or
non-civil rights cases. Race-based plaintiff-appellants succeed in 27
percent of the 66 published opinion cases they appeal while their
opponents succeed in 26 percent of the 27 cases they appeal. Whoever appeals the ruling below can expect to lose about threequarters of the time on appeal. The plaintiff-as-appellant reversal
See supra text accompanying notes 95-96.
In constitutional tort litigation, plaintiffs succeeded by settlement or court judgment in less than half of the filed cases. Eisenberg & Schwab, Reality, supra note 82, at
674, 683-84; Schwab & Eisenberg, Explaining, supra note 82, at 733. This estimate probably overstates plaintiff success because it counts as successful every case that settled.
133 Eisenberg & Schwab, What Shapes Perceptions?,supra note 82, at 518.
131
132
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FIGURE 1
Rate of Reversal by Party Appealing
Race Intent Claims, Constitutional Tort
Claims, Non-Civil-Rights Claims
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rate on appeal in intent cases is significantly different from the rate
for constitutional tort cases at the .10 level. (The defendant-asappellant reversal rate on appeal in intent cases is significantly different from the rate for constitutional tort cases at the .05 level.
The reversal rate for plaintiffs and defendants combined also differs
at the .05 level.) The intent/non-civil rights differences all point in
the same direction but are not significant at the .10 level, with the
combined plaintiff/defendant reversal rate in intent cases differing
from that in non-civil rights cases at the .17 level. We conclude that
intent claims, even more than other areas of law, show a strong affirmed effect. The relative failure of both plaintiffs and defendants
to obtain reversal on appeal suggests that, as appellate rules recourt findings
quire, appellate courts are reluctant to overturn lower
13 4
based on such factually intensive issues as intent.
In one respect the intent results are not as symmetrical as they
134

On this issue we expect that the decisionmaking process filtering published opin-

ions overstates the reversal rate.

The general criterion for publication is that the case be noteworthy rather
than routine or obvious, and thus will contribute to the development of
the law. Certainly, cases where district court judges are found "wrong"
would often fit this criterion. One would expect, then, that most reversals would be published, as well as non-routine affirmances. This filtering
effect of the criterion for publication would tend to increase the number
of reversals found in published opinions over the actual number of rever-

sals from all appeals. But this filter, without more, would be uniform
across all classes of litigation and between plaintiffs and defendants.
Eisenberg & Schwab, What Shapes Perceptions?,supra note 82, at 535. For data on federal

appellate court reversal rates in unpublished decisions, see Donald R. Songer, Criteriafor
Publication of Opinions in the U.S. Courts of Appeals: Formal Rules Versus EmpiricalReality, 73
JUDiCATrURE 307, 311 (1990). See also Burton M. Atkins, Communication of Appellate Decisions: A Multivariate Model for Understanding the Selection of Casesfor Publication, 24 LAw &
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first appear. Although plaintiff and defendant appellants have about
the same success rate on appeal, there is an important difference in
their volume of appeals. Of the 93 cases with clear appellate outcomes, 66 (71 percent) were appeals by plaintiffs. Defendants in intent cases, as in other classes of cases, appealed much less often
than plaintiffs. The reluctance of appellate courts to reverse lower
court findings thus preserves any advantage that defendants enjoyed
13 5
at the trial court level.
Absolute Success Level. A second way to measure intent claimants'
success rates on appeal is to ignore who appeals and simply ask how
often intent claimants prevail. Thirty-eight of the race-based claims,
or about three per year for the entire country, were clear victories
for plaintiffs. (This count slightly understates the raw number of
appellate victories, because our victory analysis includes only cases
with unambiguous outcomes.) By this measure, the success rate of
intent claims is not very different from the rate of success in constitutional tort litigation generally.
3.

The Complexity of Intent Cases on Appeal

Although intent cases are more stable on appeal (in the sense
that they are reversed less frequently than other cases), they are
more controversial. Intent cases generate more dissents and fewer
per curiam (unsigned) opinions than do comparable classes of
claims. Figure 2 shows the relative frequency of dissenting and
signed opinions in four classes of published appellate opinions: (1)
intent claims, (2) nonprisoner constitutional tort claims, (3) prisoner
constitutional tort claims, and (4) non-civil rights cases.
The distinctiveness of intent opinions emerges whether one
compares intent appellate opinions to nonprisoner constitutional
tort appellate opinions or to non-civil rights cases. Of the 140 intent opinions in the sample, 30 (21.4 percent) generated dissents.
In comparison, the three-circuit study shows dissents in only 10.3
percent (62 of 604) of nonprisoner constitutional tort opinions and
8.3 percent (63 of 760) of non-civil rights opinions. The unsigned
per curiam opinions, which may signal a case's relative simplicity,
occur less frequently in intent cases. The percentage of per curiam
opinions is calculated by subtracting from 100 the percentage of
Soc'Y REv. 1171, 1191 (1991) (positive correlation between publication of opinion and
reversal in English Court of Appeal).
135
The district court opinions show intent claims prevailing in 42 of 106 cases
(39.6%), a success rate lower than that of non-civil rights litigation, but not far from that
in civil rights litigation generally. Schwab & Eisenberg, Explaining,supra note 82, at 728.
The 39.6% figure includes tried cases and cases that did not reach trial. Plaintiffs lose
more often than defendants at the trial level and appellate courts do little to change this
result.
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FIGURE

2

Rate of Dissenting & Signed Opinions
Race Intent Claims, Constitutional Tort
Claims, Non-Civil-Rights Claims
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signed opinions shown in Figure 2. Per curiam opinions disposed of
only 10 of 140 (7.1 percent) intent cases. In the three-circuit study,
per curiam opinions disposed of 18.2 percent (110 of 604) of nonprisoner constitutional tort cases and 17.5 percent (133 of 760) of
non-civil rights appeals. All of the differences between intent and
other classes of cases are significant at or beyond the .05 level.1 36
The combination of stable decisions (decisions unlikely to be
reversed) with unusually high rates of dissent seems odd. If factually based intent determinations are improbable candidates for reversal, appellate judges should agree more often in such cases than
in other classes of cases. Is it that judges dissent more in cases in
which race claims prevail (or fail)? Moreover, there is little difference in the rate of dissent when cases are grouped by whether the
intent claim failed or succeeded on appeal. Perhaps judges are
more likely to dissent in all intent cases (both those that succeed and
those that fail), knowing that they will be outvoted. Or perhaps a
few of them (on both sides) are adamant about their views and disregard settled law. Whether we can predict who will dissent, or what
kinds of cases will provoke the most dissent, requires further
inquiry.
4. Remedies
Any assessment of plaintiff success would be incomplete without information about what plaintiffs win, when they win. As Table
136

Of 140 appellate intent decisions, 20 (14.3%) contained concurrences. In the

three-circuit study, concurrences appeared in 8.9% (54 of 604) of nonprisoner constitutional tort decisions and 4.9% (37 of 760) of non-civil rights decisions.
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1 shows, nonmonetary remedies dominate relief in race intent cases.
Only seven of the district court opinions and six of the appellate
opinions refer to compensatory damage awards. Fewer than ten
percent of the opinions discuss attorney fees. None of the district
opinions and only two of the appellate opinions refer to punitive
damages awards. And of the two punitive damages awards mentioned on appeal, one was overturned in an opinion in our sam38
ple 3 7 and one was overturned in a later opinion.
TABLE 1

Remedies in Intent Cases
Courts of
Appeals
Relief Awarded
Compensatory Damages
Punitive Damages
Attorney Fees
Nonmonetary Relief

District
Courts

6
2
8
42

7
0
14
63

N = 140

N = 176

These remedial results confirm the longstanding belief that injunctions are the weapon of choice in civil rights cases. In some
cases, those against state defendants, the eleventh amendment precludes retroactive damages. 139 But many cases involve purely local
defendants or individual state officials; damages are available
against both. The results suggest that fears of massive and frequent
damages awards in civil rights cases probably are unwarranted. 140
They also suggest that fear of damages awards is unlikely to serve
much of a deterrent function.
III
EXPLAINING THE OUTCOME OF RACE-BASED INTENT
CLAIMS

Volume, success rates, complexity, and remedies are important
features of intent-based litigation. More sophisticated analysis allows deeper probing of intent case outcomes and of beliefs about
the intent standard's operation. In particular, such analysis illuminates whether the intent standard functions in the way its architects
137 Lenard v. Argento, 699 F.2d 874 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 815 (1983).
138 Heritage Homes of Attleboro, Inc. v. Seekonk Water Dist., 670 F.2d 1 (1st Cir.),
cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1120 (1982).
139 See, e.g., Edelman v.Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, reh'g denied, 415 U.S. 1000 (1974).
140 Hearings, supra note 83, at 229-36 (statement of Theodore Eisenberg).
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would have anticipated, or whether it works more as its critics
charged it would. At a practical level, correlations between identifiable case characteristics and success should be useful to litigants assessing their cases.
This section first discusses the characteristics our analysis uses
to explore the intent standard. It then presents the results of models in which the outcome of an intent case is a function of various
factors describing each case.
A.

Predictors of Plaintiff Success

Intent cases have several characteristics for which one ought to
account. For example, a case's subject area (employment or voting)
should be accounted for at the same time one considers whether the
case was certified as a class action; if all class actions happen to be
employment cases, the influence of class action status per se would
be distorted without also accounting for the cases' subject matter.
Statistical analysis of intent case outcomes requires testing the importance of one factor, holding other factors constant. The need to
account simultaneously for several case characteristics prompts our
use of multivariate regression-like analysis.
Legal Theories Relied On. Arlington Heights described the kinds of
proof plaintiffs can and should offer to establish discriminatory intent. We subdivided the Arlington Heights criterion of "legislative
and administrative history" into "statements by members of the
decisionmaking body, minutes of its meetings, or reports" and
"statements by public, witnesses, press, etc."; listed the six other
Arlington Heights methods of proof; and added "bare allegation of
discrimination; no material facts pled"; "foreseeability of effects"
(because of its role in the intent standard controversy), and "perpetuation of past discrimination" (because of its historical role in
school desegregation cases). Since these bases are not mutually exclusive, we used a variable (coded 0 or 1) to account for the presence of each factor. The kinds of proof follow, with variable names
in parentheses:
1. Clear pattern or event, unexplainable on grounds other than
race ("clear pattern");
2. disparate impact short of a clear pattern ("disparate
impact");
3. statements by members of the decisionmaking body, minutes
of its meetings, or reports ("member's statement");
4. statements by public, witnesses, press, etc. ("public
statements");
5. foreseeability of effects ("foreseeability");
6. bare allegation of discrimination; no material facts pled
("bare allegation");
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7.

specific sequence of events leading up to challenged decision, or departures from normal procedural sequence
("procedure");
8. prior act of discrimination by alleged discriminator, or the
historical background of challenged decision (especially a series of official actions taken for invidious purposes) ("past
acts");
9. substantive departures from rules usually followed by decisionmaker ("substantive departure"); and
10. perpetuation
of
past
discrimination
("perpetuate
discrimination").
We hypothesized that "clear pattern" would be the best of these
predictors in the plaintiff-positive direction, and that "bare allegation," the residual category, would be strongly predictive of plaintiff
loss.
The Parties'Status. It is common to hypothesize that the status of
the plaintiff or defendant affects the outcome of cases. Corporate
plaintiffs and defendants may on average embody greater concentration of wealth and power than individual plaintiffs. 14 1 Government plaintiffs and defendants have litigation track records superior
to those of private parties.' 42 This superiority may vary depending
on the level of government involved. Public interest litigation
groups, such as the ACLU, have greater experience than individuals
and therefore may be expected to have greater success in litigation.' 43 Several variables in our study take these plaintiff-defendant
characteristics into account.
The variable "non-government plaintiff" was coded 1 when the
plaintiff or plaintiffs did not include a governmental entity and 0
when a governmental entity was a party plaintiff. Based on past
studies of the success of the government-as-litigant, we expected
government plaintiffs to fare better than purely private plaintiffs.
Since the vast majority of defendants in race-based intent cases are
governments, we did not similarly code the defendants. We did,
however, distinguish between particular types of government involved as defendant. The variable "local defendant only" was
coded 1 when the only government defendant was at the local level
and was coded 0 otherwise. This distinguishes suits against cities
and counties from suits against states, regional authorities, and the
141
Stanton Wheeler, Bliss Cartwright, Robert A. Kagan & Lawrence M. Friedman,
Do the "Haves" Come Out Ahead? Winning and Losing in State Supreme Courts, 1870-1970, 21
LAw & Soc'y REV. 403 (1987).
142
Burstein & Monaghan, supra note 7, at 375-76; Eisenberg, supra note 126, at
1598-1601 (employment discrimination cases); Schwab & Eisenberg, Explaining, supra
note 82, at 774-75 (civil rights cases).
143 Schwab & Eisenberg, Explaining, supra note 82, at 767.
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federal government. 4 4
Many believe that public interest groups, such as the NAACP
have special skills or experience in bringing discrimination claims
and that their participation might therefore increase the likelihood
of success. Alternatively, one might view such groups as having a
special agenda in bringing cases and therefore caring less about winning or losing than other plaintiffs. To take into account the presence of a public interest group in a case, the variable "public
interest group" was coded 1 when the opinion revealed the presence of a public interest group as party, counsel, or amicus, and was
coded 0 otherwise.
Some scholars comment on the difficulty of having to label
the defendant an intentional discriminator in race-based intent
cases. 145
Perhaps any judicial finding of racial discrimination-even a finding based on racially disparate effects that are insufficiently justified by the state-will carry some implication of blame for
government officials. But an inquiry centered on motive guarantees that antagonisms will be intensified, for it forces the litigants
into name-calling on one side and self-righteousness on the
14 6
other.
Reluctance to name an intentional discriminator should be more of
a problem when the defendant is still in office than when the defendant no longer serves. The variable "in office" was 1 when the public defendant was in office at the time the case was filed, and 0
otherwise.
Case Characteristics. Various case characteristics might also affect
outcomes. We hypothesized that the subject matter of the case
might be important: Supreme Court doctrine seems more relaxed
about proof of intent in voting rights cases than in other race-based
intent cases.14 7 Perhaps claims in school cases, the area in which the
federal courts made their reputations as modern champions of civil
rights, are treated better than other discrimination claims. Class action status might be thought to predict success, if one suspects that
class actions are more vigorously litigated than other actions. The
144
We coded several other status variables that proved uninteresting. These included variables accounting for whether the plaintiff was a corporation, whether the defendant was purely public, whether the defendants included a state government or state
officials, and whether the defendants included the federal government or federal officials. The governmental level variables are not mutually exclusive; combinations of defendant characteristics were permitted.
See K. KARST, supra note 71, at 154; Karst, supra note 67; Theodore Eisenberg,
145
Washington v. Davis, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN CONsTITUTION 2035-36 (Leonard Levy, Kenneth Karst & Dennis Mahoney eds. 1986).
146
K. KARST, supra note 71, at 154.
147
See cases cited supra note 49.
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existence of a class, furthermore, might be evidence of a widespread
violation. Several variables account for these case characteristics.
The variables "voting case," "employment case," and "school case"
identify the subject matter of the case, and were coded 1 where appropriate. The variable "certified class action" was coded 1 if the
148
case involved a certified class action and 0 otherwise.
In most appellate court cases, another case variable is likely to
be important in predicting outcome. Either because of standard-ofreview rules regarding deference to lower courts or because of the
difficulty inherent in overturning any prior decision, 14 9 the party
who appeals is at a disadvantage. Accordingly, the variable "defendant appealed" takes into account who has won below in the model
consisting of appellate opinions.
Judicial Characteristics. At the district court level, the individual
judge hearing a case influences the outcome. So few intent cases
are decided, however, that no individual judge will publish an opinion in more than a handful of intent cases. 150 Instead of using the
identity of the district judge, which could not lead to significant results, we used variables designed to capture shared characteristics in
the judges' backgrounds. Appellate level studies sometimes find
Democratic judges to be more liberal in their decisionmaking than
Republican judges.' 5 ' Some district court research also finds
148
We also coded for whether plaintiff had counsel. This variable is not included in
the analysis because plaintiffs had counsel in nearly all cases (as might be expected in a
data base of published opinions) and the presence of counsel was an insignificant influence on success.
149
See Burton Atkins, Interventions and Power in Judicial Hierarchies:Appellate Courts in
Englandand the United States, 24 LAw & Soc'Y REV. 71 (1990); Eisenberg & Schwab, What
Shapes Perceptions?, supra note 82; Wheeler, Cartwright, Kagan & Friedman, supra note
141.
150 No district court judge wrote an opinion in more than two or three of the cases in

our study.
151
ROBERT A. CARP & C.K. ROWLAND, POLICYMAKING AND POLITICS IN THE FEDERAL
DISTRICT COURTS 7 (1983); GLENDON A. SCHUBERT, QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OFJUDICIAL
BEHAVIOR (1959); Jilda M. Aliotta, CombiningJudges' Attributes and Case Characteristics:An
Alternative Approach to Explaining Supreme Court Decisionmaking, 71 JUDICATURE 277, 280

(1988) ("[b]eing a Democrat is associated with casting votes in favor of equal protection
claims"); Sheldon Goldman, Voting Behavior on the United States Courts of Appeals Revisited,
69 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 491, 496 (1975) [hereinafter Goldman 1975J; Sheldon Goldman,
Voting Behavior on the United States Courts of Appeals, 1961-64, 60 AM. POL. SC. REV. 370-85
(1966); Joel B. Grossman, Social Backgrounds andJudicialDecision-making, 79 HARV. L. REV.
1551 (1966); Stuart S. Nagel, PoliticalParty Affiliation andJudges'Decisions,55 Am. POL. SCI.
REv. 843 (1961); Stuart S. Nagel, Unequal Party Representationon the State Supreme Courts, 45
JUDICATURE 62 (1961);John R. Schmidhauser, Stare Decisis, Dissent, and the Background of
theJustices of the Supreme Court of the United States, 14 U. TORONTO L.J. 194 (1962); Donald
R. Songer, The Policy Consequences of Senate Involvement in the Selection ofJudges in the United
States Courts of Appeals, 35 W. POL. Q. 107-19 (1982); C. Neal Tate, PersonalAttribute Models
of the Voting Behavior of U.S. Supreme CourtJustices: Liberalism in Civil Liberties and Economics
Decisions, 1946-1978, 75 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 355 (1981); Sidney S. Ulmer, The Political
Party Variable in the Michigan Supreme Court, 11 J. POL. 352 (1962).
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greater Democratic liberality and suggests that the most important
background correlate of case outcomes is the appointing President. 15 2 Presumably, greater liberality would lead to greater support for intent claims. Other studies explore the effect of a judge's
prior experience as a prosecutor or elected office holder, or a
judge's years on the bench. To account, albeit imperfectly, for judicial backgrounds, we coded variables for the judge's party, race, and
sex; the appointing President and his party; whether the judge had
been a prosecutor; whether the judge had prior judicial experience;
whether the judge held elected office; and the judge's age and experience. 153 We controlled for the judge's background only for district court cases, where the judge's influence would be felt most
directly and would not be filtered by a record compiled in a trial
court or action of a multimember appellate panel.
Other Factors. Other influences might bear on the outcome of
race-based intent claims. History suggests that the region of the
country or the circuit court appealed to might influence case outcomes; accordingly, we tried several variables reflecting geography,
but none proved interesting. The time elapsed since Washington v.
Davis might be relevant. Cases decided shortly after Davis might not
have fully absorbed the legal standard; 5 4 appellate and lower courts
might have been reluctant to rely on the newly articulated and more
difficult standard to snatch apparent victory from plaintiffs who had
been litigating for years. Cases filed after the Davis decision might
not have evinced the same reaction, and, over time, the doctrine
may or may not have become more deeply entrenched. We account
for the passage of time after Davis with the variable "years since
Davis."
B.

Frequency of Case Characteristics

Table 2 provides the frequency of occurrence for each of the
legal theories, as well as for the other case characteristics in the
model.
The frequencies provide several insights into the intent standard. First, the most common method of proof at both the district
152
R. CARP & C. ROWLAND, supra note 151, at 34-36, 51-83, 150-52 (Nixon appointees more conservative than Kennedy appointees; Kennedy appointees more conservative than Johnson appointees); C.K. Rowland, Robert A. Carp & Donald Songer, The
Effect of Presidential Appointment, Group Identification and Fact-Law Ambiguity on
Lower Federal Judges' Policy Judgments: The Case of the Reagan and Carter Appointees 2 (unpublished paper presented at the American Political Science Association Meeting 1985) (on file at Cornell Law Review).
153
A summary of prior findings about the influence ofjudicial background may be
found in Schwab & Eisenberg, supra note 119.
154
See George L. Priest, Measuring Legal Change, 3 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 193 (1987).
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TABLE 2

Frequency of Case Characteristics: Intent Claims
Appellate Opinions
Variable

%

N

defendant appealed
plaintiff appealed
both appealed
Methods of Proof
clear pattern
disparate impact
member's statement
public statements
foreseeability
bare allegation
procedure
past acts
substantive departure
perpetuate discrimination
certified class action
non-government plaintiff
public interest group
in office
voting case
school case
employment case
local defendant only
years since Davis
Total

Dist. Ct. Opins.
%

N

NA
NA
NA

NA
NA
NA

Mean

Mean

6.68

5.35
N = 140

N = 176

court and appellate levels is a showing of disparate impact. Plaintiffs
relied on this method in 49 percent of appellate intent cases leading
to published opinions and in 39 percent of district court opinions.
The decision to appeal served as an important filter with respect to
several methods of proof. Plaintiffs relied on a "dear pattern" or on
"foreseeability" in, respectively, 29 percent and 25 percent of district court opinions. On appeal, these numbers dropped to 15 percent and 9 percent. Reliance on perpetuation of past discriminatory
effects ("perpetuate discrimination") showed a similar drop from
district to appellate courts.
Second, three categories dominate the subject matter of intent
claims-voting, school, and employment cases. Together they make
up 68 percent of district court cases; school and employment cases
constitute almost half the appeals. Public interest groups frequently
are present in intent cases, showing up in 29 percent of appellate
opinions and in 28 percent of district court opinions.
Our model tested the likelihood of a race-based intent claim
prevailing as a function of the parties' status, the case characteris-
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tics, the nature of the proof offered, and the external factors. Table
3 presents the results. For each equation, the dependent variable
was coded 1 if plaintiff's race-based intent claim prevailed and 0 if it

failed. We employed regression-like analysis to determine the effect
of each factor (independent variable), holding constant other factors

about the case.1 55
Table 3 contains the results for three different equations. The
first two equations, labeled "Prevail in District Court" and "Prevail
in Court of Appeals," include most of the variables of likely interest
in assessing the intent standard, though even these equations have
been screened to exclude potentially interesting variables that
proved to be of little influence. 156 Within each equation's results

the first column shows a variable's "odds multiplier," a standard
way of expressing the size of a variable's influence for the regression
157

technique used.
The "odds multiplier" is the amount by which the plaintiff's
odds of winning the "average" case should be multiplied if the vari-

able is present, holding all other variables constant. 158 To assess
the magnitude of a variable's effect, multiply the odds of winning
without the variable's presence by the variable's odds multiplier. An
odds multiplier greater than 1.0 indicates that the variable's pres-

ence, holding other factors constant, increases the chances of win155 Since, for present purposes, intent cases either succeed or fail, the dependent
variable in this model is dichotomous (0 or 1), and we rely on logistic regression analysis
in lieu of ordinary least-squares regression. See generally BALDUS STUDY, supra note 58, at
383; MICHAEL 0. FINKELSTEIN & BRUCE LEVIN, STATISTICS FOR LAWYERS 448 (1990);
DAVID W. HOSMER & STANLEY LEMESHOW, APPLIED LOGISTIC REGRESSION (1989). This

part of the analysis excludes cases that lack a clear prevailing party.
For these data the results obtained using ordinary least-squares regression do not
differ substantially from the logistic regression results. Models using the same variables
are both highly significant, and the important variables have similar magnitude and significance in both models.
156 See supra notes 144 & 148.
157 The Appendix contains the actual logistic regression coefficients. In multivariate
logistic regression, each estimated coefficient provides an estimate of the corresponding
variable's effect on the logarithm of the dependent variable's odds, adjusting for all
other variables included in the model. The odds multiplier is obtained by taking the
antilog of the regression coefficient. D. HOSMER & S. LEMESHOW, supra note 155, at 58.
On the merits of using the odds multiplier, see BAU.us STUDY, supra note 58, at 383-84.
The interpretation of the variable "years since Davis" differs because, unlike all other
variables, it is continuous. Its odds multiplier traces the effect of a unit increase (one
year) in the variable.
158 The odds of winning should be distinguished from the probability of winning,
even though the terms "odds" and "probability" are often used interchangeably in informal conversation. For example, "clear pattern" has an odds multiplier of 6.7. Assume that the odds of winning a case (based on all other factors about the case) are 1:1,
corresponding to a 507o probability of winning. The odds multiplier of 6.7 means that
the presence of "clear pattern" changes the odds of winning from 1:1 to 6.7:1, corresponding to an 87% probability of winning.
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TABLE 3
Logistic Regression Results
Dependent Variable = Intent-Claim-Prevailed

Prevail in
District Court
Variable

Prevail in
Court of Appeals

Signif
Signif. Odds
Odds
Multiplier
Multiplier

clear pattern
6.7
24.2
member's statement
3.7
foreseeability
perpetuate discrimination 2.8
1.9
disparate impact
1.2
public statements
.8
procedure
.7
past acts
.3
substantive departure
.0005
bare allegation
.8
public interest group
.2
non-government plaintiff
9.0
certified class action
1.1
in office
2.3
employment case
2.1
voting case
2.3
school case
2.1
local defendant only
1.0
years since Davis
NA
defendant appealed

.006
.003
.058
.109
.375
.899
.788
.560
.155
.702
.644
.066
.001
.837
.347
.471
.359
.253
.599
NA

Most Parsimonious
Model: District Court
Odds
Signif.
Multiplier

.2
6.2

.055
.001

ning; an odds multiplier of less than 1.0 indicates that the variable's
presence, holding other factors constant, reduces the chances of
winning. An odds multiplier of 1.0 indicates that the variable's presence does not change the odds of winning. Within each equation's
results, the second column shows the probability that the observed
result would occur by chance. Thus "clear pattern" not only has a
sizeable odds multiplier, but there is less than one chance in a hun59
dred that one would observe this result by chance.'
The third equation with a pair of columns in Table 3, labeled
"Most Parsimonious Model: District Court," presents the district
court result for a more parsimonious set of variables that excludes
A word is in order about how the presence of a method of proof could have an
159
odds multiplier of less than one. For example, in the "Prevail in District Court" equation, the variable "substantive departure" has an odds multiplier of .25 or .3 rounded to
the nearest tenth. Thus, holding other factors constant, if plaintiff's odds of winning
were 1:1 without "substantive departure" present, they are .3:1 with it present. How
can the presence of an additional method of proof correspond to a decrease in the
chances of winning? The small odds multiplier indicates that plaintiffs tend to prevail
when "substantive departure" is alleged only if other methods of proof are also relied
on. At the margin, it is not a helpful method of proof.
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variables of little or no statistical significance. By all measures of
160
goodness-of-fit, each of the models fits the data well.
C.

The District Court Results

The Full Base Model. The district court results confirm some beliefs about intent-based litigation and call other beliefs into
question. The single most substantial factor pushing towards plaintiff success is proof resting on an official's statement ("member's
statement"). Putting aside methods of proof, certification of a class
action most enhances plaintiffs' odds of winning. The fact of certification is a signal of success and the large stakes in such cases make
them especially worth pursuing.
With respect to the status of plaintiffs and defendants, the
small, near-significant odds multiplier for "non-government plaintiff" confirms that the government is an especially formidable plaintiff. "Local defendant only," the variable reflecting whether only
local governments or officials are defendants, has an effect in the
expected direction, but that effect is insignificant.
Several kinds of proof of intent significantly increase the chance
that a plaintiff will prevail. Relative to other methods of proof,
statements by members of the decisionmaking body ("member's
statement") and the presence of a clear pattern unexplainable on
any grounds other than race ("dear pattern") are the two most frequent and most significant indicators of plaintiff success. The next
most predictive factors are foreseeable effects ("foreseeability") and
perpetuation of past discrimination ("perpetuate discrimination").
Not surprisingly, cases deemed to have barely alleged discrimination ("bare allegation") were highly likely to lose, though there were
6
too few of these to be statistically significant.' '
The data offer further support for those concerned that intent
is difficult to prove. The impediments to subtle showings of intent
are seen by excluding cases lacking either a statement by a member
of the decisionmaking body or the presence of a clear pattern. Excluding such cases, plaintiffs prevailed in 17 of 77 (22.1 percent)
district court opinions. In cases with either very clear patterns of
discrimination or a member's statement, plaintiffs prevailed in 31 of
53 cases (58.5 percent). In other words, plaintiffs obtained about
one favorable district court opinion per year for the entire country
in cases without either clear patterns or a member's statement. Intent claimants need "smoking gun" evidence of discrimination to
160 See Appendix. For a discussion of testing goodness-of-fit in logistic regression,
see D. HOSMER & S. LEMESHOW, supra note 155, at 135-71.
"Bare allegation" can be removed from the equation with little change in the
161
other variables.
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prevail. Subtler methods of proof, though approved in Arlington
Heights, rarely carry the day.
Two surprising results are the small size and insignificance of
public interest group participation and the greater-than-one odds
multiplier of "in office." One explanation of the small size is that,
by the time a case reaches the late stages of district court procedure,' 62 the presence of public interest groups and the current status of the alleged wrongdoers is irrelevant; the importance of public
interest group participation is felt primarily in settlement negotiations or at earlier stages. The methods of proof that the court is
likely to accept are difficult for the parties to agree on and they cannot be factored into settlement decisions. They therefore remain
significant at the later stages of litigation. Below we offer an alternative explanation of the "in office" results; not only does that variable
persist in having a surprising odds multiplier at the appellate level,
63
but also becomes significant at about the .05 level.'
More ParsimoniousModel. As suggested by the many insignificant
variables in the first equation ("Prevail in District Court") in Table
3, many of the variables in the full model contribute little to the
descriptive power or goodness-of-fit of the model. The third column shows a more parsimonious model which fits the data as well as
the larger model. The more parsimonious model uses only the four
leading methods of proof ("clear pattern," "member's statement,"

"foreseeability," and "perpetuate discrimination"), together with
two status variables (plaintiff's position, or "non-government plain162

The modal method of termination in district court opinions is at trial.
One possible concern about the district court results is that, in their opinions,
district judges might only mention plaintiff's reliance on the particular method of proof
on which the court intends to rely in sustaining plaintiff's allegation of intentional discrimination. If courts systematically fail to mention failed methods of proof relied on by
plaintiffs, then the opinions provide little evidence about when a method has been unsuccessful. In fact, courts frequently do mention the use of a method of proof, whether
or not they rely on it to sustain a claim. The following Table shows the number of times
a method of proof is mentioned as a basis of the plaintiff's claim, together with the
number of times the courts relied on that method in sustaining the claim.
163

Methods of Proof
Frequencies of Allegation and Acceptance
(limited to cases with clear outcome on intent claim)
Variable

clear pattern
disparate impact
past acts
procedure
substantive departure
member's statement
public statements
perpetuate discrimination
foreseeability

Alleged

41
47
44
34
16
16
9
38
40

Sustained

30
14
31
15
12
10
6
26
28
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tiff," and "certified class action"). 64
From a doctrinal perspective, the roles of the "foreseeability"
and "perpetuate discrimination" factors are puzzling, both in the
full model and in the more parsimonious model. Neither foreseeability of disparate effects nor perpetuation of past discrimination
are included in the Arlington Heights list of factors probative of discriminatory intent, a list that is authoritative for, and binding on, the
lower courts.' 6 5 Yet both variables are almost as good predictors as
the two kinds of "smoking gun" evidence included in the Arlington
Heights list (clear pattern unexplainable on any grounds other than
race and statements by the members of the decisionmaking body);
the four variables can even be treated as interchangeable with little
loss of predictive power. Moreover, the remaining Arlington Heights
factors (including disparate impact short of a clear pattern, on which
plaintiffs relied in over one-third of the cases) contribute virtually
nothing to predicting the outcome of intent claims. For reasons unclear at this point,' 66 district court judges appear to be responding
to intent cases in ways the Supreme Court has not prescribed, and
of which it would not approve. Perhaps the lower courts are silently
rebelling against the intent standard's constraints.
Model with JudicialCharacteristics. It is possible that judicial characteristics, rather than the case characteristics studied so far, more
completely explain the outcome of district court intent cases. To
explore this possibility, we combined the variables in the most parsimonious district court model from Table 3 with a set of variables
designed to account for judges' background characteristics. Table 4
presents the results for two equations. The first pair of columns
includes only those judicial characteristics with a sizeable effect and
164

Even this model could be further reduced by treating the four leading methods

ofproofinterchangeably and constructing a variable, ranging from 0 to 4, measuring the
number of the four methods alleged in a case. This approach, of course, would require
the assumption that each of the four intervals from 0 to 4 are of equal "length." For
alternative treatments of ordered categorical variables, see GARY KING, UNIFYING POLrrICAL METHODOLOGY: THE LIKELIHOOD THEORY OF STATISTICAL INFERENCE 115-17 (1989).
This model, too, provides most of the descriptive power of the model using the four
variables of the leading methods of proof.
165 Although Arlington Heights said that the list was not exhaustive, the Supreme
Court has repeatedly quoted and referred to that list without expansion. See, e.g., Wayte
v. United States, 470 U.S. 598 (1985) (rejecting foreseeability); City of Mobile v. Bolden,

446 U.S. 55, 72-74 (1980); Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979) (rejecting
perpetuation of discrimination and foreseeability); Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482

(1977). The Court again expressly disavowed foreseeability in McCleskey v. Kemp, 481
U.S. 279, reh g denied, 482 U.S. 920 (1987).
166
Here are some speculations: Perhaps the lower court judges are still responding
to older cases; perhaps they are responding to the intent standard commentary (what a
gratifying thought!); or perhaps the facts do not match the categories very well, and factfinders are doing the best they can within the general contours of intent doctrine.
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4

Logistic Regression Results, Including Judicial Characteristics
Dependent Variable = Intent-Claim-Prevailed
Most Parsimonious

Model

Variable
Case Characteristics
clear pattern
member's statement
foreseeability
perpetuate discrimination
non-government plaintiff
certified class action
Judge Characteristics
black or female judge
prior prosecutorial experience
prior judicial experience
judge's age in years
prior elected office
Republican judge
Eisenhower appointee
Kennedy appointee
Johnson appointee
Nixon appointee
Ford appointee
Carter appointee
Reagan appointee

Odds
Signif.
Multiplier

Model Including All

Judicial Characteristics
Odds Signif.
Multiplier

7.6
10.1
3.7
3.1
.2
93

.001
.012
.037
.090
.081
.001

4.7
7.2
3.6
4.3
.1
14.1

.019
.056
.064
.062
.055
.001

4.9
4.9
5.5
1.1

.181
.013
.012
.038

5.2
3.9
8.7
1.1
2.3
2.1
.8
7.7
14.5
2.3
4.0
3.1
.003

.177
.081
.009
.112
.350
.563
.979
.806
.747
.920
.869
.892
.814

significance at or near the .10 level. The second pair of columns
shows a model that includes more judicial characteristics.
The results suggest that some judicial background characteristics can help explain case outcomes. Although the party and appointing President variables are not near any reasonable threshold
of statistical significance, other variables are. Controlling for the
case characteristics, black or female judges, 16 7 judges with prior
prosecutorial experience, judges with prior judicial experience in
state court, and older judges16 8 all treat intent cases more favorably
than judges lacking these background features. These results match
167 We combined black judges and female judges into a single category because
neither group standing alone heard enough cases to expect interesting results. Since
common wisdom is that both black judges and female judges are more "liberal" than
white male judges, they can be grouped together without destroying their individual
effects.
168 The variable "judge's age in years" is a continuous variable, not a 0 or I variable
like those in Table 4. Its interpretation differs slightly from that of the other variables.
Since the judge's age is coded in years, Table 4 reports the effect on case outcomes of a
change of one year in the judge's age. A one-year difference has an odds multiplier of
only 1.1, but a 10-year age difference (perhaps the threshold before one would expect
age to make a difference) would have an odds multiplier of 2.6.
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those of other studies of judicial influence. 169
The essential point for present purposes is not how interesting
or uninteresting the judicial characteristics results are. Rather, it is
that, regardless of which set ofjudicial chararacteristic variables are
used, the case characteristic variables retain their essential features.
All of the most interesting case characteristic variables (those in Table 4) retain the direction of their effect (for or against plaintiffs),
remain sizeable, and remain statistically significant at approximately
the same level in this model as in the model that did not include
judicial characteristics. To the extent one can control for judicial
influence on case outcomes, our central findings remain intact.
D.

The Appellate Court Results

As Figure 1 suggests, the appellate data in Table 3 strongly
confirm the affirmed effect.' 70 By far, the single best predictor of
who will win on appeal is who won below.
The rest of the data substantially support the notion that the
cross-section of cases appealed is not a random sample of the cases
decided by opinion below. Several variables that were significant at
the district court level lose significance or change sign on appeal.
Not only is "member's statement," the variable most highly correlated with plaintiff success in the district courts, insignificant on appeal, but its odds multiplier drops below 1.0 in the appellate
equation. One can infer that strong cases with decisionmaker statements at the district court level may not be appealed. Other notable
variables change effect as well. Though not highly significant, "certified class action," a factor strongly correlated with district court
success for plaintiffs, has an odds multiplier substantially less than
1.0 in the appellate equation. The public interest group variable
becomes even more prodefendant (odds multiplier less than 1.0) in
the appellate data. "Procedure" (an unusual procedural sequence
or series of events leading to the challenged decision) undergoes a
similar shift and becomes statistically interesting. "Past acts" by the
alleged discriminator shifts from antiplaintiff (odds multiplier less
than 1.0) in the district courts to highly proplaintiff at the appellate
level. "Perpetuate discrimination" changes from a large, proplaintiff, marginally significant variable, to a substantial antiplaintiff, but
statistically insignificant, variable on appeal. The coefficients of the
169 Goldman 1975, supra note 151, at 501, 503 (age most important background
variable for civil liberties issues); Tate, supra note 151. Other studies find voting records
less clearly correlated with age and prior experience. J. WOODFORD HOWARD, JR.,
COURTS OF APPEALS IN THE FEDERALJUDICIAL SYSTEM (1981).
170 The appellate analysis excludes cases that lack a clear prevailing party on appeal,
as well as cases in which both parties appeal.
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three major case categories, employment, voting, and schools, all
change from proplaintiff in the district court data to prodefendant
171
on appeal.
Not every variable undergoes a transformation. "Clear pattern" remains large and positive in both equations, though much
less significant in the appellate equation. The "non-government
plaintiff" variable remains favorable to defendants in both equations, though it is of no significance in the appellate equation. The
surprising direction of "in office" at the district court level reappears on appeal and becomes significant at the .051 level. Cases
limited to local government defendants fare even better on appeal
than at the district court level, and the variable is significant at the
.018 level. The appellate data also show that increasing passage of
time ("years since Davis") renders it more difficult for plaintiff to
prevail.
Not only do important variables shift in terms of who they
favor, but one cannot reject the hypothesis that no method of proof
is a significant factor in explaining success on appeal. Although we
would not have predicted this, one plausible explanation is available. By the time of trial, the principal uncertainty about the outcome of a case is how the fact-finder will assess the proof. When the
fact-finder does resolve the evidence of intent in favor of one party,
the appellate court has less leeway to overturn that finding than it
would to overturn a legal ruling. The reduced scope of appellate
review is largely independent of the method of proof presented at
trial. This explanation is consistent with the earlier evidence about
the relative stability of intent cases on appeal. Just as intent appeals,
because they are so tied to fact-finding, are more stable than other
appeals, so the method of proof, as the most fact-sensitive aspect of
an intent case, resists appellate second-guessing.
A second, related explanation pertains to the parties' decision
whether to appeal or to settle after trial without appealing. If the
principal uncertainty in the case is the fact-finder's reaction to the
171
One concern about the appellate results is that introducing the new variable "defendant appealed" masks or changes the observed effect of the other variables in the
equation. For example, it may be that, not taking into account who is appealing, "member's statement" is in fact a proplaintiff variable in the appellate equation. Cases with
"member's statement" simply tend to be appealed by defendants, who lost below. The
"defendant appealed" variable might absorb this proplaintiff information, leaving little
for the appellate "member's statement" variable to show. Similar considerations might
apply to other variables.
To test this hypothesis, one can run the appellate equation without "defendant appealed" as an independent variable. There are marginal shifts in the significance of the
other variables, but no noteworthy sign changes. The one striking effect of this deletion
is to make the overall model less significant and a less accurate predictor of case outcomes. For example, the successful prediction rate falls from about 82% to about 73%.
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proof, that uncertainty is removed as soon as the trial ends. After
trial, the parties have seen how a presumably objective fact-finder
reacts to their arguments. They should be better able to agree on
the outcome of an appeal. To the extent they agree, they can save
the costs of appeal by adopting the predicted outcome, usually af72
firmance, as a basis for settlement negotiations.1
Focusing on the filtering effect of the decision to appeal may
offer insights into two variables that are significant on appeal, but
less interesting at the district court level: "in office" and "local defendant only." On appeal, both variables highly correlate with a
successful intent claim. What could explain, contrary to expectation, that having the alleged wrongdoer in office at the time of filing
would increase the chance of success? It may be that this factor
pushes officials to appeal decisions that stand relatively little chance
of being reversed. To accommodate existing political relationships,
it may be necessary for government litigators to appeal on grounds
less meritorious than they would otherwise require. The goal of the
appeal may be as much to send a supportive signal to the challenged
official as to win the case. The same reasoning might explain the
greater-than-one odds multiplier of "in office" in the district court
equation. The decision to press ahead with litigation is skewed by
73
the political necessity of satisfying those in office.1
Like "in office," "local defendant only" is a prodefendant factor
at the district court level. "Local defendant" is even more
prodefendant, and significantly so, at the appellate level. It may be
that, compared to other government defendants, local officials feel
greater pressure to resist claims and to pursue appeals, even when
objective assessment of the cases suggests that they will lose.

IV
CONCLUSION

Plaintiffs infrequently file intent claims. Each year at the district
court level, not more than one intent claim per district succeeds.
Activity is even scarcer at the appellate level, and fewer than one
published appellate opinion per year, per circuit, rules favorably for
an intent claimant. Perhaps surprisingly, intent claimants' success
rates do not differ substantially from the success rates of other civil
172 Similar reasoning might support a prediction of 50% success rates on civil appeals, adjusted for possible asymmetric stakes of the parties, because the parties do not
appeal a random cross-section of completed cases. Priest & Klein, supra note 8, at 28-29.
Presumably, they mainly appeal cases in which the outcome is not a foregone conclusion. Yet, as this study confirms, there is a persistent tendency for appellants to succeed
well below 50% of the time. See Eisenberg & Schwab, What Shapes Perceptions?,supra note
82; Wheeler, Cartwright, Kagan & Friedman, supra note 141.
173
One would therefore expect "in office" to be a negative predictor of settlement.
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rights litigants. Intent cases are not as susceptible to reversal on
appeal as other cases, a result that holds for both intent claimants
and their opponents; but this finding may be explained by the intensely factual nature of intent claims.
In assessing which factors influence the outcome of race-based
intent claims, the study's most striking findings emerge: the variables that predict success in intent claim cases are not those one
would anticipate. With little loss of predictive power, two factors
not mentioned by the Supreme Court can be interchanged with the
two kinds of "smoking gun" evidence included in the authoritative
list of methods of proof found in Arlington Heights. Furthermore,
there are sharp differences in the performance of the variables between the district court and appellate levels.
Two factors limit how far one can go in attributing volume and
success results to the intent standard. Ideally, one would like a stable course of pre-Washington v. Davis case law, with ascertainable
volumes and success rates to contrast with our post-Davis findings.
These data would then be combined with accurate measurements
over time of the level of discrimination in society. But both the preDavis data and the quantitative measurement of discrimination are
unlikely ever to be satisfactory.
Pre-Davis race-based equal protection law was in a state of confusion. After announcing in several opinions that disparate effects
could establish violations of the equal protection clause, the Court
discarded effects and demanded a showing of illicit motive. 174 Until
Davis clarified the standard in equal protection cases, plaintiffs were
likely to plead and prove a mixture of intent and impact-based theories. Sorting out the change attributable to Davis's new standard
seems impossible without more stable pre-Davis doctrine. 175 And
even if more satisfactory doctrinal data were available, there would
be little confidence in any method of measuring the level of societal
discrimination, and, therefore, little confidence about the calculated
volume of race-based filings one could expect to see if a standard
less stringent than the intent standard were in place. The available
social science data suggest inherent problems in measuring the level
of discrimination in society.
The claims for this aspect of the study must therefore be more
modest. First, if one believes there are troubling levels of official
discrimination in America, the volume of race-based intent litigation
provides no basis for confidence that litigation is successfully ad174
175

See Eisenberg, supra note 67.

But even after reading all pre-Daviscases one would be hard pressed to establish
a useful baseline for comparative purposes. It would also be difficult to ascertain
whether one had collected all or nearly all of the pre-Davis cases.
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dressing the problem. Although we acknowledge that published
opinions, both district and appellate, may not be representative of
all underlying case filings, this does not mean that one must abandon hope of obtaining useful insights about an area of law from
them. 176 Although many of our quantitative statements are estimates, they represent substantially more informed estimates than
could be made without knowledge of the opinions. Second,
whatever amount of discrimination is being redressed through litigation, the selection of which discrimination to redress does not seem
to be proceeding according to the Supreme Court's guidelines.
More ambitious claims may be warranted for the methodology
developed here. In one important respect we need make no apology for the sample of cases studied. They are representative-indeed, for most scholars they are the full population-of the cases
shaping perceptions of the legal system. Published opinions are all
most of us ever work from. Our findings with respect to both levels
of opinions, and to the differences between district and appellate
opinions, suggest the benefits of analyzing a substantial fraction of
all the opinions in a legal area. Such analysis may generate a rethinking of any legal area to which it is applied.

176
Similarly, one can derive useful knowledge about trial success rates from knowledge of motion success rates and vice versa. Eisenberg, supra note 125.
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Goodness-of-Fit Data
(1)

(4)

Table 3
Prevail in District Court

-2 Log Likelihood
Model Chi-Square
Goodness of Fit

Chi-Square
93.485
65.182
95.934

df Signif.
98 .610
19 .000
98 .540

Predicted
FAILED
PREVAILED
Observed
FAILED
PREVAILED

Table 4
Most Parsimonious Model

12

83.10%

13

34

72.34%

Chi-Square

79.004
46.796
83.017

Predicted
FAILED PREVAILED
Observed
FAILED
PREVAILED

df Signif.
72 .267
20 .001
72 .176

8

85.45%

12

26

68.42%

(3)
Table 3
Most Parsimonious District Court
Chi-Square df
103.306 111
6
55.361
109.115
111

Signif.
.686

.000
.533

Predicted
FAILED

PREVAILED

PREVAILED

58
11

PREVAILED % Correct

11

84.06%

36

76.60%

Overall 81.03%

-2 Log Likelihood
Model Chi-Square
Goodness of Fit

% Correct

Overall 78.49%

Observed
FAILED

Observed
FAILED

(5)
Table 4
Model Including ALL Judicial Characteristics

47

-2 Log Likelihood
Model Chi-Square
Goodness of Fit

FAILED

78.81%

(2)
Table 3
Prevail in Court of Appeals

-2 Log Likelihood
Model Chi-Square
Goodness of Fit

Chi-Square df Signif.
87.128 105
.897
69.484
10
.000
92.382 105
.806
Predicted

% Corr.

59

Overall

-2 Log Likelihood
Model Chi-Square
Goodness of Fit

PREVAILED % Correct

58

13

81.69%

12

35

74.47%

Overall

78.81%

FAILED
Observed
FAILED
PREVAILED

Chi-Square df
70.518
82
66.937
19
70.410
82

Signif.
.813
.000
.816

Predicted
PREVAILED % Correct

50

11

81.97%

10

31

75.61%

Overall 79.41%

